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I. INTRODUCTION
Probation is a sentence under which a person found guilty of a
crime or adjudicated delinquent or in need of special supervision is
released subject to court-imposed conditions and subject to supervi-
sion.1 A probation sentence is a final order for purposes of appeal. 2
However, upon proof of a violation of probation, the sentencing court
may revoke the "final" probation sentence and impose a new sentence
within the statutory limits or may dedine to revoke probation and
modify the terms of the probation sentence as originally imposed.3
The rules applicable to probation revocation proceedings have devel-
oped rapidly over the last eighteen years. Probation revocation pro-
ceedings are in a procedural class of their own with elements of both
criminal and civil procedure. Even though probation revocation can-
not occur without a precedent criminal proceeding and even though a
resentencing proceeding following a probation revocation is a critical
stage of the precedent criminal case, the probation revocation proceed-
ing itself is not considered to be a stage of the precedent criminal case.
The rules governing probation revocations in Nebraska have been de-
veloped by the Nebraska Legislature, the United States Supreme
Court, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Nebraska
Supreme Court. Each body acts independently, as is the nature of our
system, and sometimes they adopt inconsistent approaches. There has
been no single reference work for discovering the esoteric rules relat-
ing to probation revocation in the state courts of Nebraska. Hopefully,
this Article will fill that void.
Probation revocation is a narrow, specialized type of proceeding.
1. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2246(4) (Cum. Supp. 1988). Given the inclusion of persons
found delinquent or in need of special supervision in the statutory definition of
probation, the Probation Administration Act should be construed to apply to pro-
bation dispositions in juvenile cases heard by county courts, as well as probation
sentences in the adult criminal system, except where special provisions of the
Juvenile Code control. E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-286(4) (1988) relating to revoca-
tion of juvenile probations. The definition of "court" for purposes of the Proba-
tion Administration Act does not include the separate juvenile courts, but does
include county cou-ts sitting as juvenile courts. Nxs. REv. STAT. § 29-2246(2)
(Cure. Supp. 1988).
2. State v. Lynch, 223 Neb. 849, 394 N.W.2d 651 (1986); State v. Christiansen, 217
Neb. 740, 351 N.W.2d 67 (1984); State v. Kinney, 217 Neb. 701, 350 N.W.2d 552
(1984).
3. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2268 (1985).
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Defense counsel are frequently thrust into probation revocation de-
fense by court appointment. Indeed, the area does not generate a
great deal of fee activity. As a result, the income incentive for most
lawyers to devote the necessary time to find and synthesize the law of
probation revocation is not high. Statewide, only 944 of 28,972 proba-
tion cases supervised by the Nebraska Probation System during 1987
were concluded by revocation. 4 Yet, most alleged probation violators
face imprisonment upon revocation of probation. The stakes are high
for the individuals who have their probation revoked. Actual proba-
tion violators are people who generally have put themselves on the
fast track to correctional facilities. Once there, they have nothing to
lose by filing liability claims against their former defense counsel.
Criminal defense is the eighth highest source of professional liability
claims nationally.5
The purpose of this Article is to provide the bench and bar with a
probation revocation primer. This primer was written to accomplish
the following goals: (1) to improve the quality of probation revocation
representation (on both sides) and (2) to offer a convenient basic refer-
ence on the law of probation revocation in Nebraska courts. In order
to help accomplish these goals, this Article will discuss the statutory
framework for probation revocation actions, the pre-1971 Nebraska
case law, the revolution in probation revocation law resulting from the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,6 and
the post-Gagnon decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Nebraska Supreme Court.
Developments relating to each component of the probation revocation
process will be examined.
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOLLOWING
PROBATION VIOLATIONS
The Nebraska Probation Administration Act,7 creating the state-
wide probation system and the statutory framework for probation and
probation revocation, was adopted in 1971. The part of the Act dealing
with probation and probation revocation was based on the American
Bar Association (ABA) Standards Relating to Criminal Justice, Pro-
bation, adopted by the ABA in 1970.8 Under the Probation Act, proba-
4. NEBRASKA PROBATION SYSTEM, COMPOSITE REPORT (1987). The Douglas County
criminal courts accounted for only 134, Lancaster County accounted for 115, and
all six counties of the Fifth Judicial District only accounted for 33 of the total
1987 revocations.
5. ABA, STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYERs' LIABILITY, PROFILE OF LEGAL MAL-
PRACTICE (1986).
6. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
7. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-2246 to -2268 (1985)[hereinafter Probation Act or the Act].
8. The legislative history reveals the legislature was not told it was based on the
ABA Standards, but the Nebraska Supreme Court said it was in State v. Dovel,
[Vol. 68:516
NEBRASKA PROBATION REVOCATION
tion became a sentence in itself.9 There had been no prior Nebraska
statutory rules relating to probation revocation. The Probation Act
predated the decision in Gagnon v. Scarpelli by two years. In some
respects, the Nebraska Legislature was ahead of the Court, but it did
not foresee the detailed rules the Court would adopt. By comparison
with the present rules, the Probation Act was not comprehensive,
even though it was state of the art in 1971.
Under the Probation Act, probation officers are given considerable
discretion when they realize that one of their probationers has vio-
lated a term of probation. If a probation officer has reasonable causeO
to believe a probationer has violated or is about to violate a term of
probation and that the probationer will neither attempt to flee the
jurisdiction nor place lives or property in danger, the probation officer
shall file a violation report with the sentencing court. A copy of the
report must also be sent to the county attorney of the county in which
probation was imposed. The court may then, on the basis of the report
or on such additional investigation as the court deems necessary, (1)
suspend any further proceedings, (2) instruct the probation officer to
handle the violation informally without instituting formal revocation
proceedings, or (3) refer the violation to the county attorney for appro-
priate action."1
If a probation officer has reasonable cause to believe a probationer
has violated or is about to violate a probation condition and that the
probationer will attempt to flee the jurisdiction or will endanger lives
or property, the probation officer shall arrest the probationer without
a warrant.' 2 Immediately after an arrest and detention of a proba-
tioner, the probation officer must notify the county attorney and sub-
mit a written report of the reason for the arrest. The county attorney
then has discretion to either order the probationer's release or to file
with the sentencing court either a motion or information to revoke
189 Neb. 173, 201 N.W.2d 820 (1972). C.f ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.1 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962). The Act appears to be a combination of the ABA Stan-
dards and the Model Penal Code provisions relating to probation.
9. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2269(4) (Cur. Supp. 1986). Prior to the adoption of the Pro-
bation Act, sentence was suspended and then probation was granted. See, e.g.,
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2218 (1964)("the court may, in its discretion, enter an order,
without pronouncing sentence, suspending further proceedings and placing the
accused on probation").
10. Reasonable cause and probable cause are synonymous. W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 5.1(b) (2d ed. 1987).
11. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2266(1) (1985). Presumably, the county attorney then has
discretion to file or decline to file a revocation motion, although a strong argu-
ment can be made that the county attorney has no discretion after a court refer-
ral. But see NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2266(4) (1985).
12. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2266(2) (1985). The probation officer may ask any peace




There is no statutory requirement that a preliminary hearing be
accorded to persons accused of probation violations. However, the
Probation Act does require a prompt consideration of the alleged vio-
lations by the sentencing court whenever a revocation motion or infor-
mation is filed.14 Further, the sentencing court may not revoke
probation nor increase the requirements imposed on the probationer
unless a violation is proved by clear and convincing evidence at a hear-
ing preceded by proper notice. 15 Prior to the hearing, the accused pro-
bationer is entitled to receive written notice of the grounds on which
the motion or information is based prior to the hearing. At the hear-
ing, the probationer has the statutory rights to hear and controvert the
adverse evidence; to offer defense evidence; and to be represented by
counsel.16
If the court finds a violation of probation has been committed, it
has several dispositional options. The court may revoke probation and
impose a new sentence within the range permitted on the underlying
conviction. If the court believes revocation would be inappropriate,
the court may: (1) reprimand and warn the probationer, (2) order in-
tensified supervision and reporting, (3) impose additional probation
conditions, (4) extend the term of the probation, or (5) order any com-
bination of these options.17
The Probation Act does not deal with a number of issues, some of
which have been resolved by case law decided after the Act was
adopted or by later statutes, and some of which can be resolved only
by analogizing from law governing other matters. Specifically, the
Probation Act does not address preliminary hearings, rights adviso-
ries, confrontation and cross-examination, appointed counsel for indi-
gents, appeals, or applicability of the rules of evidence. However, all
of these areas have been clarified by subsequent case law, or, with re-
spect to evidence, by the Nebraska Evidence Rulesl8 and case law. At
least two other areas not addressed in the Probation Act have not been
13. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2266(3) (1985).
14. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2267 (1985).
15. Id. The pre-Act case law contained one inconsistency of importance. In one case,
the court said the state's burden of proof in a revocation hearing was to present
any probative evidence sufficient to convince the trial court that the probationer's
conduct in violating probation indicated the probationer would not refrain from
future criminal conduct without punishment. State v. Ward, 182 Neb. 370, 154
N.W.2d 758 (1967). But, in an earlier case, the court said proof beyond a reason-
able doubt was not required and that clear and satisfactory evidence was suffi-
cient to prove a probation violation. Phoenix v. State, 162 Neb. 669, 77 N.W.2d 237
(1956). The court was never called upon to resolve the apparent conflict. The Act
resolved the conflict.
16. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2267 (1985).
17. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2268 (1985).
18. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-101 to 1103 (1985).
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clarified by later judicial or legislative action: probation violation
arrest warrants and the granting or denial of bail to alleged probation
violators in custody.
A. Probation Violation Arrest Warrants
The warrantless arrest of alleged probation violators by their pro-
bation officers is not the routine practice.19 Usually, probation officers
file violation reports with the sentencing courts. If the courts refer
the cases to the prosecutors, the prosecutors may choose to pursue rev-
ocation by filing motions or informations seeking revocations. The
court then sets appearance dates on the motions to revoke and the
alleged violators are then notified to appear. Most alleged violators
appear voluntarily in response to the notice to appear. Some do not
receive the notices or orders to appear. Others have absconded (which
is usually one of the bases for the violation reports in their cases) prior
to the issuance of the notice or order to appear. Finally, some flee
after notice. Obtaining the appearance of uncooperative alleged pro-
bation violators poses, at the very least, a conceptual problem. The
usual device to ensure appearance is then the issuance of an arrest
warrant. But, upon what authority are arrest warrants issued in such
cases?
The only reference in the Act to arrest with a warrant appears in
the statutory provision: "Whenever a probationer is arrested, with or
without a warrant, he shall be detained in a jail or other detention
facility."20 The statute implies that probation violation arrest war-
rants may be issued, but nowhere in the Probation Act does a clear
provision authorizing arrest warrants or defining the bases for their
issuance appear. The statutes specifically dealing with the issuance of
arrest warrants do not mention warrants for alleged probation viola-
tions either.21 There are statutory provisions allowing the state parole
administrator to issue arrest warrants for alleged parole or probation
violators when instructed to do so by the parole board or district
judge.22 Although there is simply no direct statutory provision au-
thorizing the issuance of probation violation arrest warrants by courts,
a number of points can be argued to legitimate the issuance of proba-
tion violation arrest warrants.
Probation officers have the authority to arrest, without warrant,
any probationer an officer has reasonable cause to believe has violated
or is about to violate probation and will attempt to flee or will endan-
19. At least not in the Fifth Judicial District.
20. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2267(2) (1985).
21. NEB. Rrv. STAT. §§ 29-401 to -437 (1985).
22. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,102 (1987). This provision appears to be a leftover from
the days when county courts did not have the authority to sentence offenders to
probation and there was no statewide probation system.
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ger lives or property. If a nonjudicial state employee, a probation of-
ficer, has warrantless arrest authority, a sentencing court logically
should have authority to issue arrest warrants on at least the same
grounds. This point is buttressed by the indirect reference to warrants
noted earlier.
Further, if an alleged probation violator with notice fails to appear
for revocation proceedings, the violator has also committed criminal
contempt by failing to appear.23 Criminal contempt is punishable by
fine, imprisonment, or both,24 and therefore constitutes an offense as
defined by the Nebraska Criminal Code.25 County and district judges
and clerk magistrates have the power to issue warrants for the arrest
of any person charged with a criminal offense.2 6 To do so, they must
issue a warrant upon the filing of a complaint, "charging the commis-
sion of an offense against the laws of this state," supported by a show-
ing of probable cause to believe the offense charged has been
committed.27 This point does not apply with equal force to alleged
probation violators without notice or with respect to whom notice or
the lack of notice cannot be shown. However, uncooperative alleged
probation violators, convicts by definition, cannot be allowed to thwart
the orderly administration of justice by their failure to appear for rev-
ocation proceedings. Thus, authority for the issuance of probation vio-
lation warrants (especially if based on contempt) can be supported by
an interesting mixture of inherent authority,28 extrapolation from the
indirect statutory reference to warrants, the warrantless authority of
probation officers, and creative use of the definition of "offense"
under the criminal code. Obviously, a direct, clear legislative grant of
authority to issue probation violation arrest warrants would be
desirable.2 9
B. Bail for Alleged Probation Violators
The authority to grant bail to arrested alleged probation violators
has even less statutory support than the authority to issue warrants.
The constitutional provisions relating to bail do not apply to alleged
23. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2121(3), (4) (1985).
24. Id.
25. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-104 (1985).
26. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-403 to -404 (1985).
27. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404 (1985). This duty is modified by the discretion to issue
citations in lieu of arrest whenever the court believes a citation would serve all of
the purposes of an arrest warrant. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-425 (1985).
28. Which is the real basis for contempt proceedings.
29. There was a clear, direct grant of authority to issue probation violation arrest
warrants before 1971, but it was deleted and not replaced when the Probation




probation violations.30 There is no statutory authority for release on
bail following alleged probation violations. The bail statutes deal with
prejudgment release s l and release on bail pending appeal.32 Further,
the Nebraska Supreme Court has not been presented with a case rais-
ing the issue of a trial court's authority to release an alleged probation
violator on bail pending revocation proceedings.
However, the supreme court has decided a case in which it ad-
dressed the situation of denying bail when there is no statutory provi-
sion for granting bail. In State ex rel. Partin v. Jensen,33 the court
said:
Modern notions of due process and fundamental fairness demand that a citi-
zen should not arbitrarily be denied bail solely because there is no statute
specifically authorizing the granting of bail .... The inherent power of a court
may be exercised as to bail although it is not specifically vested by statute.34
Thus, by analogy, alleged probation violators can be released on bail
based upon the inherent power of the court.35
C. Conclusion
The Probation Act was adopted before the United States Supreme
Court revamped probation revocation law at the constitutional level.
The legislature's attempt to regulate the field by adopting the Act rep-
resented the state of the art of the day.3 6 However, the legislature has
not amended the Act to reflect later judicial developments.37 None-
theless, the legislature's power in the area of probation revocation has
been sharply curtailed by the United States Supreme Court's adoption
of a constitutional blueprint for probation revocation proceedings.
III. THE GAGNON REVOLUTION3S
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court adopted the rule that
probation revocation proceedings under the federal probation statutes
only needed to be conducted fairly. Notice of specific charges of pro-
30. See N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 9.03 (1983).
The fiction that probation violation proceedings are not criminal proceedings
leads to this result.
31. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-901 to -908 (1985). The probation sentence is the judgment.
32. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-541.03(4) (Cum. Supp. 1988); Id- § 29-2303 (1985).
33. 203 Neb. 441, 279 N.W.2d 120 (1979)(release on bail pending appeal in a habeas
corpus action challenging extradition).
34. Id. at 447, 279 N.W.2d at 123.
35. Release on bail and even on their own recognizance is routine in the Fifth Judi-
cial District. The Parole Board has statutory authority to release alleged parole
violators pending revocation proceedings. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1,119 (1987).
36. C. ABA STANDARDs, PROBATION § 5.1 (1970).
37. Although the legislature did amend the Juvenile Code's probation revocation
provision and the parole revocation statutes to reflect the Court's developments.
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-286(4) (1988); Id- §§ 83-1,119 to -1,152 (1987).
38. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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bation violations was not required, and evidentiary hearings were not
necessary. Further, summary revocation hearings were sufficient.3 9
However, by 1973, the Court's concepts of fairness in all procedural
matters had undergone an amazing metamorphosis, the nature of
which is well known to first-year law students and constitutional
scholars. It should have been predictable that the Court would trans-
port its general fundamental fairness due process analysis into the
area of probation revocation if someone asked it to do so. The Court
did just that in Gagnon v. Scarpelli.40 In order to appreciate fully the
effect of Gagnon in Nebraska, a quick look at the state of pre-Gagnon
judicially developed Nebraska probation revocation rules is useful. In
addition, the Court took some clear, pre-Gagnon steps in the direction
of revolutionizing the law of probation revocation that merit brief
examination.
A. Pre-Gagnon Probation Revocation Rules in Nebraska
The Nebraska Supreme Court had developed a set of procedural
rules relating to probation revocation long before the Gagnon decision
was announced. Essentially, the granting and revocation of probation
were matters left to the discretion of the trial courts. The procedures
to follow were also left to the discretion of the trial courts.41 As late
as 1967, the Nebraska Supreme Court took the position that "[i]t is
sufficient if it appears that probationer was afforded a fair and impar-
tial hearing, that reasonable grounds for revocation of probation ex-
isted, and that there was not an abuse of the discretionary powers
vested in the court."42
Further, an indigent Nebraska probationer was not entitled to ap-
pointed counsel for revocation proceedings. The right of a probationer
to even an informal hearing was considered a matter of statutory right
only. The court saw no constitutional right to revocation hearings. 43
The court accepted the characterization of probation as an act of grace
controlled by the old right/privilege distinction.44 From that view-
point, the probationer's interest in continued conditional liberty was
irrelevant.
The Nebraska Supreme Court announced its decision in State v.
Holiday45 on November 3, 1967. Ten days later, the United States
39. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
40. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
41. State v. Holiday, 182 Neb. 229, 153 N.W.2d 855, modified, 182 Neb. 410,155 N.W.2d
378 (1967) [hereinafter Holiday I and Holiday II respectively].
42. State v. Holiday, 182 Neb. 229, 233, 153 N.W.2d 855, 858 (1967).
43. Id. at 232, 153 N.W.2d at 859 (1967).
44. This Article will not examine the demise of right/privilege analysis in constitu-
tional law.
45. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court announced its decision in Mempa v. Rhay and Wal-
7ling v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles.4 6
Mempa and Walkling were each convicted of felonies and placed on
probation with sentencing deferred. Each was subjected to later revo-
cation proceedings and sentenced. Mempa had been represented by
appointed counsel when his initial guilty plea was accepted. Walkling
had retained counsel when he tendered his guilty plea. However, at
the revocation and sentencing hearing, Mempa was not represented.
The trial court did not inquire of Mempa about whether he desired
appointed counsel or about the attorney appointed for him earlier.
Walkling appeared at the revocation without his attorney, whom he
claimed to have retained for the revocation, but who did not appear.
The trial court went ahead anyway, revoking Walkling's probation
and sentencing him. The record did not show whether Walkling re-
quested appointed counsel, but had he requested appointed counsel,
the request would have been denied. The Court noted its earlier deci-
sions stood for the proposition that counsel must be appointed for indi-
gents at every stage of criminal proceedings at which substantial
rights of the criminally accused may be affected. Sentencing is such a
stage. The Court then held that whether the proceedings involved
were called probation revocations or sentencings, counsel must be
afforded.47
Back in Nebraska, counsel in the Holiday case moved for rehear-
ing. The Nebraska Supreme Court issued its supplemental opinion on
December 29, 1967.48 The court withdrew the part of its Holiday I
decision that was in conflict with Mempa and held that Holiday's re-
quest for appointed counsel for his revocation proceeding should have
been granted. In effect, the court held that indigent alleged probation
violators are entitled to appointed counsel for revocation proceedings.
The court did not limit its holding to cases in which sentence had not
been pronounced before the imposition of probation. Of course, at
that time, Nebraska courts did not impose sentence before placing de-
fendants on probation.49 The Holiday II holding, therefore, is limited
to that circumstance. But logically, Holiday II should also apply
where courts do impose sentence when placing the defendant on pro-
bation. A revocation of probation under the present system results in
the imposition of a new sentence as a matter of course.
Questions relating to the sufficiency of the pleadings also were re-
46. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
47. Id. at 137 (because of the sentencing aspect, not the revocation aspect). Thus,
Mempa became the first shot in the building revolution.
48. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
49. The court withdrew only that part of Holiday I which dealt with the right to
appointed counsel in revocation proceedings. The statement that there is only a
statutory right to be heard before revocation of probation was included in the
court's analysis of the right to counsel issue.
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solved before the federal intrusion into state probation revocation pro-
ceedings. With respect to the precision of the charging document used
to initiate a probation revocation proceeding, the court held that tech-
nical formality and precision of the charge are not prerequisites to
"judicial investigation of whether... defendant has observed the con-
ditions of his probation." 50 However, the probationer is entitled to a
statement of the facts revealing a violation of probation.51 In State v.
Ward,52 the probationer claimed the charging document was insuffi-
cient to invoke the court's jurisdiction because the information did not
show on its face that the alleged violation occurred during the proba-
tion term. The court noted the information described the conduct con-
stituting the alleged violation and held it was sufficient despite the
technical deficiency. Further, in Young v. State,53 the court held it
was not error to fail to list the state's witnesses on the charging
document.
The Nebraska Supreme Court also established the substantive is-
sues involved in probation revocations before the Gagnon revolution.
In Young, the court identified the two questions presented at revoca-
tion proceedings. "First-is there probative evidence 'showing a viola-
tion of probationary conditions'? If not, then that disposes of the
matter.... If there is a finding of a violation of the probationary order,
then the second question arises ... shall probation be continued."54 It
is interesting to note that the court posited the second question as
whether the probation shall be continued, as opposed to the more neg-
ative question of whether probation shall be revoked. Whether the
court meant that anything should be inferred from its word choice is
unknown.
The definition of the substantive issues presented in revocation
proceedings establishes the nature of the evidence admissible at revo-
cation hearings. That is, any evidence relevant to either issue should
generally be admissible even if it is not relevant to both issues.55 The
statutory rules of evidence do not apply to probation revocation pro-
ceedings,5 6 but there must be some limit to what evidence courts must
admit in revocation hearings. Relevance is a reasonable limiting de-
vice and can be applied as a matter of inherent power. Of course, due
process must be afforded at revocation hearings. To that end, the
rules of evidence can be used as guidelines in determining the type of
50. Phoenix v. State, 162 Neb. 669, 673, 77 N.W.2d 237, 240 (1956).
51. Id.
52. 182 Neb. 370, 154 N.W.2d 758 (1967).
53. 155 Neb. 261, 51 N.W.2d 326 (1952).
54. Id. at 268-69, 51 N.W.2d at 330-31.
55. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-401 (1985).




evidence that satisfies due process requirements.57
B. Morrissey v. Brewer
The combination of the Probation Act of 1971 and the Nebraska
case law already discussed forms the background for examining the
revolutionary federal intrusion into state probation revocation proce-
dures that came in 1973. As noted earlier, the Mempa decision was the
first shot in the revolution. The Court did not jump directly from
Mempa into probation revocation. It tackled state parole revocation
procedure first. In Morrissey v. Brewer,5 8 both the parolees involved
were arrested and returned to the Iowa penitentiary at the request of
their parole officers without a hearing before the recommitments. If
they were given hearings at all, the hearings were held at least a
month after the arrests. In Morrissey, the Court held that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment required at a minimum a
system of hearings before revocation of parole. The Court found pa-
rolees have a protectible interest in their continued conditional lib-
erty. Likewise, the Court found the states have an interest in prompt
processing of parole violation matters. The Court balanced the respec-
tive interests and arrived at the conclusion that informal proceedings
would adequately protect the interests of all concerned parties.
Noting, but apparently not appreciating, the limits on its power to
create procedural rules for state systems,5 9 the Court adopted a de-
tailed set of "minimum requirements of due process,"60 including both
a preliminary hearing and a formal revocation hearing. The hearings
are to be held before independent hearing officers who need not be
judicial officers or lawyers. Some specific standards set out by the
Court are as follows:
With respect to the preliminary hearing .... the parolee should be given no-
tice that the hearing will take place and that its purpose is to determine
whether there is probable cause to believe he has committed a parole viola-
tion. The notice should state what parole violations have been alleged. At the
hearing the parolee may appear and speak in his own behalf; he may bring
letters, documents, or individuals who can give relevant information to the
hearing officer. On request of the parolee, [any] person who has given adverse
information on which parole revocation is to be based is to be made available
for questioning in his presence. However, if the hearing officer determines
that an informant would be subjected to risk of harm if his identity were dis-
closed, he need not be subjected to confrontation and cross-examination.
The hearing officer shall have the duty of making a summary, or digest, of
57. In re Interest of D.L.S., 230 Neb. 435, 438, 432 N.W.2d 31, 34 (1988).
58. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
59. Id. at 488. Justice Douglas dissented from the detailed minimum requirements
on the ground that the Court should not tell the states the precise procedures
they should follow. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 499-500 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
60. Id. at 489.
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what occurs at the hearing in terms of the responses of the parolee and the
substance of the documents or evidence given in support of parole revocation
and of the parolee's position. Based on the information before him, the officer
should determine whether there is probable cause to hold the parolee for...
revocation.6 1
The Court did not indicate whether the preliminary hearing would be
a minimum requirement in all cases. Further, the Court did not spec-
ify whether the preliminary hearing could be waived or whether it
was intended to be a requirement only when the accused parolee was
taken into custody. However, the Court did indicate that, with respect
to the final hearing, the hearing must be accorded only to parolees
who want a final hearing.6 2 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude
that a preliminary hearing can be waived. Whether an express waiver
is required, or whether the failure to request a preliminary hearing
operates as a waiver, remains undecided in the Court's decisions.
The purpose of the final hearing is to determine any contested fac-
tual issues and to consider "whether the facts as determined warrant
revocation."63 At the final hearing, accused parolees must be given an
opportunity to be heard and to show, if possible, that they have not
violated their parole, or, if they have, that mitigating circumstances
suggest the violations do not warrant revocation. Further, the final
hearing must be offered within a reasonable time after an accused pa-
rolee is taken into custody. The Court said a lapse of two months
"would not appear to be unreasonable." 64
With respect to the final hearing, the minimum requirements of
due process include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations...
(b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him;
(c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documen-
tary evidence;
(d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation);
(e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board,
members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and
(f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and
reasons for revoking parole.
6 5
Despite the detailed statement of the minimum requirements, the
Court emphasized its position that the final hearing should not be
equated with a criminal trial. The procedure should be flexible
enough to admit evidence including letters, affidavits, and other mate-
61. Id. at 486-87.
62. Id. at 487.
63. Id. at 488.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 489.
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rial that would be inadmissible in a criminal trial.66 As is apparent
from the above discussion, Morrissey substantially altered the law of
parole revocation.
C. Gagnon v. Scarpelli: Its Impact on Probation Revocation
One year after Morrissey, Gagnon v. Scarpelli 67 revolutionized the
law of probation revocation. Scarpelli pleaded guilty to a charge of
robbery and was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. However,
execution of the sentence was suspended and Scarpelli was placed on
probation. Two months later, in another state under interstate com-
pact supervision, he was caught in the act of committing a burglary.
The agency having jurisdiction over Scarpelli, the Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Public Welfare, revoked Scarpelli's probation without a hear-
ing and without counsel.68 The Court characterized probation
revocation as not a part of a criminal prosecution, but noted that it can
result in a loss of liberty. As a result, due process is required in proba-
tion revocation proceedings. The Court adopted the Morrissey rules
for probation revocation cases without even restating the rules.
In Gagnon, the Court also chose to consider the issue of whether
due process requires the appointment of counsel for requesting indi-
gents accused of probation violations. The Court held that the consti-
tutional right to counsel does not apply, because the proceeding is not
part of the criminal prosecution. The Court declined to adopt a bright-
line rule for the appointment of counsel. Instead, the Court adopted a
case-by-case rule.
Presumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in cases where,
after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee
makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not
committed the alleged violation... or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter
of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justi-
fied or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that
the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. In pass-
ing on a request.., the responsible agency also should consider, especially in
doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking ef-
fectively for himself. In every case in which a request for counsel at a prelimi-
nary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated
succinctly in the record.
6 9
Gagnon created an incongruous result with respect to the right to
counsel. In cases in which a defendant is resentenced following proba-
tion revocation, an indigent defendant could be denied appointed
counsel at the revocation proceeding. By contrast, under MempaO the
66. Id. The Court did not reach or decide the question of whether accused parolees
would be entitled to the assistance of counsel, retained or appointed.
67. 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (8-1 decision).
68. Id. at 780.
69. Id. at 790.
70. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
indigent defendant would be entitled to appointed counsel for the re-
sentencing. Ironically, the resentencing ,could not occur without the
revocation. Therefore, the revocation proceeding logically should be
considered a critical stage of the proceedings. But, because of the fic-
tion that probation revocation proceedings are not part of the underly-
ing criminal case, the revocation hearing is not considered a critical
stage in the proceedings. The Nebraska Supreme Court may have re-
solved the incongruity in Holiday II for Nebraska revocations, if Holi-
day II is read expansively, as it should be.
Both Morrissey and Gagnon were appeals from revocations con-
ducted by administrative agencies, not by courts. Mempa, however,
was an appeal from a revocation by a court. Strictly speaking, Gagnon
should not apply in Nebraska. If held to apply, as it has been,71 there
is justification to support the proposition that Gagnon can be distin-
guished. It should also be remembered that Gagnon sets the constitu-
tional floor below which the states may not go. However, the states
remain free to adopt higher independent standards. The Nebraska
Supreme Court has adopted some higher independent standards
which will be discussed.
The adoption of a new legal doctrine normally generates a new
wave of further litigation exploring all facets of the new doctrine, cre-
ating refinements, clarifications, and further explication. The adop-
tion of the Morrissey-Gagnon rules has been no exception to the
normal course. The United States Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and the Nebraska Supreme Court have all been
called upon to develop the Morrissey-Gagnon doctrine and have done
so. Those areas of the doctrine that have been developed further re-
main to be examined. The remainder of this Article will be directed to
that end. The doctrine will be broken into components which will be
developed further and examined separately.
IV. THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
A. Nature of the Hearing
The label "preliminary hearing," as used in criminal procedure, de-
scribes a number of different types of hearings. The types of hearings
include, among others: (1) preliminary hearings required by Gerstein
v. Pugh72 dealing with pretrial detentions; (2) preliminary hearings
held to determine whether felony defendants should be held for trial;
and (3) preliminary hearings in probation revocation proceedings. It is
important for all participants to have a clear conceptual grasp of the
type of preliminary hearing involved in probation revocations. A good
71. State v. Kartman, 192 Neb. 803, 224 N.W.2d 753 (1975).
72. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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way to attain conceptual clarity is to contrast the Gerstein preliminary
hearing with the Gagnon preliminary hearing.
In Gerstein, the Court did just that. Gerstein dealt with the rights
of persons arrested without warrants on informations filed, by the
prosecutor. The decision applied only to persons subjected to re-
straints on their liberty beyond the condition that they appear for
trial.73 The issue at a Gerstein hearing is whether there is probable
cause for detaining the arrestee pending further proceedings. "This
issue can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing. The
standard is the same as that for arrest."74 The hearing need not be
adversarial in nature.75 Further, there is no right to appointed counsel
at the hearing because it is not a critical stage of the case.7 6
In contrast, the Gagnon preliminary hearing is adversarial with a
limited right to counsel, limited right to confrontation, and a right to
present live testimony. Further, the Gagnon preliminary hearing,
"more than the probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and preserving live testi-
mony, since the final revocation hearing frequently is held at some
distance from the place where the violation occurred."77 Thus, more
is required to deprive convicts of their conditional liberty than is re-
quired to deprive accused persons of their complete liberty. Appar-
ently, this is done in order to ease the process of discovery and
perpetuation of testimony in an indeterminate number of cases for an
indeterminate number of convicts.78
The preliminary hearing in revocation cases is more akin to the
felony preliminary hearing than to the Gerstein preliminary hearing.
As a result, it supplies the opportunity for defense counsel to develop
an appropriate approach to the final hearing. Defense counsel may be
able to expose weaknesses in the prosecution's case through effective
cross-examination leading to a refusal to hold the accused probationer
for final hearing. Counsel may be able to develop information for
later impeachment use at the final hearing. Favorable testimony of
witnesses who may fail to appear at the final hearing can be preserved
(assuming such witnesses appear at the preliminary hearing). Also,
the essence of the prosecutor's case can be discovered. Finally, miti-
gating information may be uncovered. 79 The opportunity to pursue
73. Id. at 125 n.26.
74. Id. at 120.
75. Id. at 126.
76. Id. at 122.
77. Id. at 121 n.22. The Court gave no evidence of the frequency upon which it relied.
78. It could be argued that more should be required to deprive accused persons of
their liberty, but any such argument would ignore centuries of tradition and run
headlong into the current get-tough-on-criminals political philosophy. The effort
to make the argument, most likely, would not be successful.
79. Cf Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
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these possibilities can make insisting on a preliminary hearing a
worthwhile effort for the defense, especially if the alleged violation is
not a new criminal conviction.
B. The Preliminary Hearing Requirement
Federal practice and Nebraska practice differ on the question of
when a preliminary hearing is required. The federal rule requires a
preliminary hearing whenever a probationer is held in custody on a
charge of probation violation.8 0 The rule is based in part on the
Eighth Circuit decision in United States v. Strada.8 In Strada, the
court held that preliminary hearings are only required in cases in
which the probationers are taken into custody and deprived of their
conditional freedom.8 2 Strada appeared voluntarily and was not taken
into custody until after his revocation hearing.83 Likewise, the federal
rule does not require a preliminary hearing for accused probationers
who appear in response to show cause orders, or who were in custody
pursuant to a new charge, or who were in custody pursuant to convic-
tion of a later charge, or who were arrested on the probation violation
charge but obtained their release on bond or otherwise.8 4 The federal
rule is simple and clear. The Nebraska case law is neither simple nor
entirely clear. The Probation Act is silent.
A basic knowledge of the Nebraska Supreme Court's rules relating
to felony preliminary hearings is essential to understand its decisions
on the requirement of probation revocation preliminary hearings, as
well as to keep the two types of hearings conceptually separate. The
right to a preliminary hearing on felony charges is a statutory right.8 5
An information charging a felony may not be filed in the district court
80. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32.1.
81. 503 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1974). Accord Petition of Meidinger, 168 Mont. 7, 539 P.2d
1185 (1975). See also Armstrong v. State, 312 So. 2d 620 (Ala. 1975)(no need for
preliminary hearing if adequate notice and sufficient time to prepare a defense
are granted).
82. United States v. Strada, 503 F.2d 1081, 1084 (8th Cir. 1974).
83. Id.
84. FED. R. CPiM. P. 32.1 advisory committee's notes. The federal rule only applies to
probation revocations in federal courts. However, given the process followed in
developing federal rules, the federal rule does represent an authoritative inter-
pretation of federal constitutional requirements that could be useful to the prose-
cution in appropriate state cases. See also United States v. Sutton, 607 F.2d 220
(8th Cir. 1979)(failure to hold preliminary hearing harmless error where proba-
tioner serving sentence of imprisonment on new conviction at time of probation
violation arrest).
In Chilembwe v. Wyrick, 574 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1978), the court held that
where obtaining permission before leaving the state is a condition of probation,
probationer's presence in another state without permission is sufficient probable
cause to believe the probationer has violated probation to dispense with the re-
quirement of a preliminary hearing.
85. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-504 (1985).
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until a preliminary hearing has been held or waived.86 But, if a felony
information is filed without a precedent preliminary hearing, the ac-
cused must object before tendering a plea to the general issue. In the
absence of a timely objection to the failure to afford the accused a pre-
liminary hearing, the objection is deemed waived.8 7 The failure to
conduct a preliminary hearing is not a jurisdictional defect.88 A felony
defendant who appears with counsel and goes to trial is deemed to
have waived arraignment and to have pleaded not guilty by such
conduct.8 9
As a corollary of the rule that a preliminary hearing must be held
or waived before the filing of a felony information, the rule is that any
prosecutor-initiated amendment in the charges filed after preliminary
hearing must not change the nature of the charges unless the accused
is granted a new preliminary hearing. But no new preliminary hear-
ing is required if the amended charge includes some of the elements of
the original charge without the addition of any element irrelevant to
the original charge.9 0 Finally, even if the evidence presented at a fel-
ony preliminary hearing was not sufficient, the error is deemed cured
if the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to permit a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.91 The Nebraska Supreme Court has
transported some, but not all, of its felony preliminary hearing rules
to the area of probation revocation preliminary hearings.
In State v. Ferree,92 the trial court allowed the prosecution to
amend its "complaint" on the day after the probation revocation pre-
liminary hearing was held9g to allege new and different probation vio-
lations. Ferree appeared for the final hearing with counsel, and was
found to have violated his probation as alleged. Apparently Ferree did
not request a new preliminary hearing, and he did not object to the
newly alleged violations being heard. Further he may or may not have
denied the newly alleged violations.
On appeal, the supreme court did not discuss the sufficiency of the
evidence presented at the final hearing.94 The Ferree court did find
that the "complaint" on which the preliminary hearing was held al-
86. The rules are different with respect to felony charges brought by indictment.
87. Lingo v. Hann, 161 Neb. 67, 74, 71 N.W.2d 716, 722 (1955).
88. Id. at 75, 71 N.W.2d at 722.
89. Maher v. State, 144 Neb. 463, 471,13 N.W.2d 641, 648 (1944); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-
1816 (1985).
90. State v. Ferree, 207 Neb. 593, 597, 299 N.W.2d 777, 779 (1980).
91. State v. Franklin, 194 Neb. 630, 635, 234 N.W.2d 610, 615 (1975).
92. 207 Neb. 593, 299 N.W.2d 777 (1980).
93. The charging instrument in probation revocation matters properly is denomi-
nated either a motion or an information, not a complaint. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-
2266(3)(b), 29-2267 (1985).
94. The sufficiency of the evidence at the final hearing must not have been raised as
an issue on appeal.
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leged a violation not supported by the evidence adduced at the prelimi-
nary hearing.95 The supreme court reversed and remanded the case to
the district court with directions to conduct a new preliminary hear-
ing, because the amended "complaint" alleged violations of a different
nature and identity than did the original pleading on which the pre-
liminary hearing had been held. The evidence adduced at the prelimi-
nary hearing did not relate to the newly alleged violations. Therefore,
the court believed the accused probationer had not been afforded due
process.
The Ferree decision was consistent with the court's precedents re-
lating to amended felony charges filed after felony preliminary hear-
ings. The Morrissey-Gagnon rules did not deal with the factual
circumstances presented in Ferree. The Nebraska Supreme Court de-
cided Ferree on a combination of prior analogous state procedural rul-
ings and due process.9 6 The Ferree decision appears to have adopted
an independent state standard, but the decision is not entirely clear on
this point. The supreme court did not need to determine whether Fer-
ree was given adequate notice. However, had Ferree raised the issue
of notice as it related to his preliminary hearing,97 it would have been
apparent he was denied the type of notice required under Morrissey-
Gagnon before the preliminary hearing as a result of the filing of
amended allegations after the preliminary hearing.
The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision on the question of
whether Ferree waived a new preliminary hearing by not requesting
one was not consistent with the court's felony preliminary hearing
precedents. Waiver of important federal rights cannot be presumed
from a silent record.98 Therefore, the question of whether one waives
the preliminary hearing by proceeding to the final hearing without
requesting a new preliminary hearing, is a matter of federal constitu-
tional law. The right to a felony preliminary hearing is a state statu-
tory right in Nebraska. The right to a probation revocation
preliminary hearing is a federal constitutional right. The different
treatment of waivers of the different types of preliminary hearing
stems from the different sources of the rights involved. The Nebraska
Supreme Court applies rights derived from both state law and federal
constitutional law to probation revocation. Therefore, counsel should
address the sources of whatever rights they wish to advocate on their
clients' behalf in probation revocations.
95. State v. Ferree, 207 Neb. 593, 299 N.W.2d 777 (1980).
96. Whether the due process that had been denied Ferree was federal or state due
process is impossible to determine from the court's opinion.
97. But, the Eighth Circuit has held that written notice is not required before the
preliminary hearing, only before the final hearing. United States v. Pattman, 535
F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1976).
98. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
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It is clear following Ferree, that, in Nebraska, a probation revoca-
tion preliminary hearing may be waived only when the waiver is made
by an affirmative waiver on the record.99 It seems that preliminary
hearings are required for all alleged probation violators in Nebraska,
unless proper waivers are obtained. Therefore, counsel for both par-
ties, as well as the courts, should take care to create a properly de-
tailed record of the waiver. To be considered valid, the waiver must
have been made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.100
C. Preliminary Hearing Venue
The Morrissey-Gagnon rules require the preliminary hearing to be
held at or reasonably near the place of the arrest. 0 1 While the Court
did not say what arrest it meant,102 it is reasonable to assume it meant
the probation violation arrest. The Morrissey Court referred to inter-
state supervision cases, where the ability of the accused probationer or
parolee to collect evidence would be hampered if the accused proba-
tioner could not take steps to develop the evidence until after removal
to the state of the sentencing court. The Court also may have been
concerned that accused probation violators would be imprisoned and
remain there without bail after commencement of revocation proceed-
ings. While this is a likely fact of life for many accused parole viola-
tors, it is not necessarily true for many accused probation violators.103
The logistical problems faced by accused probationers in an intrastate
context are far less severe.
In Nebraska, the place of the arrest for the proper preliminary
hearing venue means the place of the probation violation arrest when
that arrest occurs in Nebraska even though the violation was commit-
ted in another state. For example, Gerson Merrill Kartman, while on
probation in Nebraska, committed a new crime in Oklahoma. Com-
mitting the new crime was a violation of his probation. Kartman was
arrested for that violation while physically present in Nebraska. On
appeal, Kartman challenged the sufficiency of the preliminary hear-
ing. The Nebraska Supreme Court did not specify the grounds of
Kartman's challenge in its opinion. The court simply stated it found
no prejudice to Kartman "in any of the proceedings related to the pre-
99. The Nebraska Supreme Court has adopted a county court rule that requires waiv-
ers of felony preliminary hearings to be made on the record through the court's
supervisory power over state court procedures. NEB. UNIF. CouNTY COURT R. 15.
100. The record should demonstrate the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of
any such waiver because the supreme court cited to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
235 (1969).
101. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972).
102. E.g., the arrest for the probation violation, or an arrest for a new criminal charge
forming the basis for the violation arrest?




liminary hearing."104 In its opinion in Kartman's subsequent federal
habeas action, the United States District Court discussed the challenge
in detail. Among other things, Kartman claimed that since the offense
for which the state sought revocation was committed in Oklahoma,
the preliminary hearing should have been held in Oklahoma, not in
Nebraska. However, since Kartman was arrested in Nebraska on the
probation violation, the federal district court ruled that the prelimi-
nary hearing in Nebraska was held reasonably near the place of the
arrest.105 Had Kartman been arrested for the probation violation in
Oklahoma, the Morrissey-Gagnon rules would have required that the
preliminary hearing be held in Oklahoma.
Morrissey did not address specifically the situation of intrastate
revocation proceedings. Gagnon did, but made no change in the re-
quirement that the preliminary hearing be held reasonably near the
place of the arrest or violation. The Nebraska Supreme Court has
dealt with the proper venue for the preliminary hearing in a case in
which the probationer was arrested in a county other than the county
of the sentencing court. In State v. Ferree,1 0 6 Ferree was arrested for
violation of a Holt County District Court probation sentence in Lan-
caster County where he was serving a penitentiary sentence in a sepa-
rate case. He was returned to Holt County and the preliminary
hearing was held there. The supreme court found no infirmity in
holding the preliminary hearing in Holt County instead of Lancaster
County, because Ferree was already incarcerated at the time of the
probation violation arrest and because all of the records relating to his
probation were in the possession of the Holt County District Court.
No cases have as yet reached the supreme court in which the viola-
tor was not arrested on the probation violation, the violation was com-
mitted in a county not the county of the sentencing court, the
preliminary hearing was held in the sentencing court's county, and the
violator challenged the preliminary hearing venue. Preliminary hear-
ings are usually waived, so the absence of such a case is not surprising.
The Morrissey-Gagnon rules do not indicate who should conduct the
preliminary hearing when the proper venue is not in the county or
even located within the judicial district of the sentencing court.
Such cases as the hypothetical described above present difficult, or
at least interesting, logistical questions in terms of the proper agency
or body to hold the preliminary hearings and their jurisdiction to do
so. How does the Lancaster County Court obtain jurisdiction over a
Seward County Court probation revocation proceeding? If an agency
other than a court conducts the preliminary hearing, how does that
nonjudicial agency obtain jurisdiction? Does the United States
104. State v. Kartman, 192 Neb. 803, 806, 299 N.W.2d 753, 755 (1975).
105. Kartman v. Parratt, 397 F. Supp. 531, 533 (D. Neb. 1975).
106. 207 Neb. 593, 299 N.W.2d 777 (1980).
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Supreme Court have the authority to grant jurisdiction over probation
revocation proceedings to agencies other than the sentencing court?
Venue and subject matter jurisdiction are properly matters for leg-
islative determination because of the need to deal with the sorts of
logistical questions just posed. Case-by-case resolution of such
problems is simply not appropriate. However, the Court injected itself
into these problems with the requirement of a probation violation pre-
liminary hearing to be held at or reasonably near the place of the
arrest or violation. Despite the Court's intrusion into legislative mat-
ters on the constitutional level, it would seem that the legislature
could act on venue and subject matter jurisdiction questions, as long as
the "reasonably near" rule is honored. Further, in the intrastate con-
text, the decision of a state legislature on the question of what is rea-
sonably near ought to be entitled to respect as a determination of a
coordinate branch of government.
D. Identity of the Hearing Officer
Under the Morrissey-Gagnon rules, nearly anyone not directly in-
volved in the case can serve as the preliminary hearing officer. Pre-
liminary hearing officers need not be judicial officers or lawyers. The
Court restrained itself in establishing a minimum rule on this point.
The Nebraska Supreme Court adhered to this part of the rules in State
v. Calder.107 The deputy clerk of the district court heard Calder's pre-
liminary hearing. Nothing in the record suggested the deputy clerk
was involved in anything relating to Calder or his probation nor that
she was subject to anyone's influence relating to the case. The
supreme court approved of the use of court clerks as preliminary hear-
ing officers, as long as they are not involved in the cases they are as-
signed to hear. The use of clerk magistrates as preliminary hearing
officers in the county courts should also be acceptable.OS Apart from
the consideration of making the most beneficial allocation of judicial
time, nothing should prevent the sentencing judges themselves from
conducting the preliminary hearings in probation revocations.1 0 9
107. 212 Neb. 248, 322 N.W.2d 426 (1982).
108. In State v. Moreno, 193 Neb. 351, 227 N.W.2d 398 (1975), the probationer attacked
the use of the chief district probation officer as the preliminary hearing officer,
but did not make his objection until he was before the supreme court. The
supreme court did not reach the issue as a result. In State v. McFarland, 195 Neb.
395, 238 N.W.2d 237 (1976), the county court conducted the preliminary hearing
on a felony probation revocation motion. The district court conducted the final
revocation hearing. No issue was raised before the supreme court on the identity
of the preliminary hearing officer.
109. The idea of preserving the sentencing judge's impartiality by keeping the sen-
tencing judge's mind empty regarding the facts of the case is a myth. Impartiality
is a characteristic of an open, disciplined mind-not an empty mind. The sentenc-
ing judge, at least in smaller jurisdictions, will have reviewed the probation of-
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Using a probation officer not involved in supervising the case, or
even the chief district probation officer of the district in which revoca-
tion is pending, as the preliminary hearing officer does not seem suffi-
cient to impart to the proceeding an unimpeachable aura of
impartiality on the part of the factfinder,11 0 but would be allowable
under the present form of the Morrissey-Gagnon rules. Whether this
practice could withstand analysis at the appellate level remains to be
seen because a test case has not yet reached the appellate level.
E. Hearing Officer Reports
Under the Morrissey-Gagnon rules, the preliminary hearing officer
has a duty to prepare a summary or digest of the hearing in terms of
stating the substance of the evidence supporting revocation, the al-
leged violator's responses, and the alleged violator's position with re-
spect to revocation. In addition, the hearing officer should make a
finding of the existence or non-existence of probable cause to hold the
alleged violator for final hearing. If the hearing officer finds probable
cause exists, that finding is sufficient to detain the alleged violator.
Yet, formal findings of fact and conclusions of law are not required
because the result of the preliminary hearing is not a final determina-
tion. The Court said the utility of the written exercise lies in its poten-
tial for reducing the risk of error.1 11 But, strict compliance with the
hearing officer report requirement may not be necessary in all cases.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the sufficiency of
the hearing officer's report in Kartman v. Parratt.l'2 The hearing of-
ficer's report did not set forth the hearing officer's reasoning, it did
not summarize the evidence presented, and it did not report the re-
sponses of the probationer. The hearing officer did, however, make a
specific finding of probable cause. The court of appeals noted that
Kartman had counsel and his preliminary hearing was recorded. A
transcription of the proceedings could have been obtained without dif-
ficulty. The court of appeals was unable to perceive any prejudice to
Kartman from the formal deficiencies of the hearing officer's
report.113
Obtaining a verbatim transcription of the preliminary hearing, as a
matter of common sense, obviously would be more useful to counsel
ficer's violation report in deciding whether to refer the case to the prosecutor and
will have advised the probationer of the alleged violation(s) at the intake hearing.
If an arrest warrant is involved, the sentencing judge will have also considered
the case in acting on the application for the arrest warrant.
110. Use of probation officers from other probation districts would solve the problem.
111. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972).
112. 535 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1976).
113. The Nebraska Supreme Court has not decided any cases on the sufficiency of the
preliminary hearing officer's report.
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and the alleged violator than would a report summarizing the sub-
stance of the evidence and the probationer's responses. The report
would be most useful only in those systems where the preliminary
hearing is not recorded. Where the finding is nothing more than prob-
able cause to require a final hearing, the utility of the hearing officer's
report is quite low, except to an appellate tribunal seeking ways to
lighten its own workload. Requiring a written report from the prelim-
inary hearing officer, as the Court did in Morrissey-Gagnon, as a mat-
ter of minimum due process does not materially assist accused
probationers in systems where the proceedings are recorded. The
written report is only of benefit to the appellate court. The Court at
least could have been candid about its reason for requiring a prelimi-
nary hearing officer report. Further, as long as there is no change in
the alleged violations after the preliminary hearing and the evidence
at the final hearing is sufficient to prove the alleged violations were
committed and that revocation is warranted, the sufficiency of the evi-
dence at the preliminary hearing logically becomes irrelevant. The
truly high stakes are on the line at the final hearing, not at the prelim-
inary hearing. Nevertheless, the sufficiency of the evidence at the pre-
liminary hearing and the sufficiency of the preliminary hearing
officer's report provide defense counsel and probation violators with
ammunition to seek reversals despite the merits of the case made at
the final hearing.114
V. THE FINAL HEARING
A. Nature of the Final Hearing
An alleged violator must be given the opportunity to have a final
hearing, if he or she chooses, prior to the final decision on revocation
under the Morrissey-Gagnon rules.115 The final hearing must lead to
a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and consideration of
whether the facts as determined warrant revocation of probation. The
alleged violator must be given the opportunity to be heard and to at-
tempt to show that no violation was committed, or, if the probationer
did commit a violation or violations, that there were sufficient mitigat-
ing circumstances to excuse the violation(s) and to militate against
revocation. 1 6 Despite its adoption of a detailed set of prpcedural
rules, the Court claimed it did not intend to create an inflexible struc-
114. The rights of accused probationers to confront adverse witnesses at preliminary
hearing and to appear and present evidence at preliminary hearing have not been
dealt with in any decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, or the United States Supreme Court since the adoption of the
Marrissey-Gagnon rules. See N. COHEN & J. GoBERT, supra note 30, at § 9.22.




ture.117 The Court said it did not intend to equate the final revocation
hearing with a criminal prosecution.1 1 8 It did exclude from revocation
hearings such tactics as attempts to relitigate issues determined by
other fora, such as new criminal convictions. It considered the final
hearing to be a narrow inquiry.119
The nature of the questions to be determined at the final hearing
requires some flexibility, especially in the area of admissible evidence.
The first question is a straightforward, retrospective question of fact:
has the probationer violated one or more conditions of probation?12o
Counsel and courts habitually deal with questions of historical fact.
The second question, which conceptually only arises if a violation is
proved, is a prospective question of prediction: can this probation vio-
lator successfully continue on probation, or, is a less rehabilitative,
more punitive disposition necessary? The Court couched the second
question in terms of whether the individual is able to live in society
without committing antisocial acts.121 The Court's formulation is
more applicable to felony probationers than to most misdemeanor pro-
bationers, depending on one's meaning of the term antisocial. How-
ever, protection of society is also a basic issue with respect to a number
of misdemeanors.122 Prediction innately is a discretionary matter,
even though predictions in probation revocations must be based on
facts.
In practice, the two questions are not dealt with separately. Evi-
dence relevant to both questions is presented in a single hearing.
Counsel for both parties should make the effort to offer evidence rele-
vant to both questions. The revocation court may not be inclined to
revoke on proof of just any violation.
B. Violations Warranting Revocation
The question of what types of violations warrant revocation is not
subject to a single answer. The Nebraska Supreme Court and the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have adopted divergent positions on
the question. In State v. Caar,123 the probationer's only proved viola-
tion was a failure to report to the probation officer one month (he was
117. Id. at 489-90.
118. Id. at 489. Consistent with the view that a probation revocation proceeding is not
part of a criminal prosecution, the Court has held the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers does not apply to probation violation detainers. Carchman v. Nash, 473
U.S. 716 (1985). Both in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972), and in
Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 731 (1985), the Court indicated its belief that a
new criminal conviction was conclusive proof of a probation violation.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 479.
121. Id. at 480.
122. E.g., third degree sexual assault, driving under the influence of alcohol, etc.
123. 197 Neb. 42, 246 N.W.2d 657 (1976).
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late reporting the preceding month). The trial court revoked Clark's
probation. The supreme court affirmed, holding: "It is clear that.., a
violation of a single condition of probation can support revocation."' 2 4
In United States v. Reed,125 the probationer failed to report repeat-
edly, failed to give notice of an address change, failed to find employ-
ment, and failed to make restitution. The district court injected the
restitution issue on its own motion. The Eighth Circuit vacated the
revocation and remanded for further proceedings, noting:
The decision to revoke probation should not merely be a reflexive reaction to
an accumulation of technical violations of the conditions imposed-upon the
offender.... Rather, probation should be revoked only in those instances in
which the offender's behavior demonstrates that he or she 'cannot be counted
on to avoid antisocial activity.' The decision to revoke [Reed's] probation was
based not on commission of a new crime or other egregiously antisocial behav-
ior, but merely on Reed's failure to report, to give notice of an address change,
to find employment, and to make restitution.-
2 6
If probation should not be revoked for violations like the ones commit-
ted by Reed, then why should such conditions be included in the pro-
bation order at all? The court of appeals did not address this question
in its opinion, but the inescapable inference from the court's choice of
language is that a complete lack of cooperation is not grounds for revo-
cation, only a law violation or some injury to others warrants revoca-
tion in the Eighth Circuit's view.
A number of offenders are in need of structure and stability in
their lives. Their lack of structure and stability is one of the factors
leading to the lifestyle that got them sentenced to probation. Proba-
tion sentences for such people are designed, in part, to impose struc-
ture and stability in the hopes that the imposition will teach them the
benefits of a different lifestyle.127 Conditions of probation of the sort
that Reed violated are directed at that purpose, and, additionally, at
the goal of monitoring the probationer's progress or lack of progress.
The Eighth Circuit view ignores this aspect of the purpose of proba-
tion sentences. A probationer who refuses repeatedly to abide by such
rehabilitative conditions may not be amenable to rehabilitation. Such
a probationer not only demonstrates an unwillingness to make efforts
toward rehabilitation, but also interferes with effective supervision.
However, the Eighth Circuit has not been consistent in its decisions
on whether the violations warranted revocation. In United States v.
124. Id. at 47, 246 N.W.2d at 660.
125. 573 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1978).
126. Id. at 1024-25 (quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972)).
127. Of course, imposing such probation terms ignores or violates the personal auton-
omy of individual offenders, but whether sentencing that violates individual au-
tonomy is philosophically justifiable is a question outside the scope of this Article.
Any sentencing having as its goal the rehabilitation of the offender may violate
autonomy.
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Smallwood,128 the probationer's failures to report to the probation of-
fice and. to report his current address, after an earlier attempt to re-
voke his probation for his failures to report to the probation office and
to reside with his father, were considered sufficient violations to war-
rant revocation. In United States v. Goeller,12 9 the probationer's fail-
ures to submit monthly report forms, to report changes of address, to
participate in a psychological evaluation, and to keep his counseling
appointments were deemed sufficient cause to revoke. In United
States v. Burkhalter,13o the probationer's poor performance and poor
attendance in a required vocational training program and his failure to
abide by his halfway house's rules were deemed adequate cause to re-
voke his probation after only three months on probation. The court
believed Burkhalter had shown a pervasive unwillingness to follow a
rehabilitation program, justifying revocation even though he had not
endangered society by his violations. 13 ' However, in dictum in United
States v. Rodgers,132 the court of appeals indicated the probationer's
failures to report his change of employment, change of address, and
repeated failures to report to the probation office were not sufficient
violations to warrant revocation without some form of recorded ex-
plicit consideration of lesser sanctions by the trial court.
All five of these Eighth Circuit decisions were three-judge panel
decisions. The panels' composition was different in each case. 133
Smallwood predated Reed, but Reed was cited by the Burkhalter and
Rodgers panels. Smallwood was cited by the Rodgers panel.
Burkhalter was cited by the Goeller panel. The Eighth Circuit has not
adopted a definitive stance on what violations warrant revocation.
The inconsistency in its decisions on the point may result from a pref-
erence for deciding each case on its unique circumstances, or, as a fre-
quent by-product of appellate decisionmaking by variable membership
panels.
C. Sufficiency of Notice and Motion/Information
Fidelity to the fiction that probation revocation is not part of a
criminal prosecution requires that only minimal notice of the alleged
128. 536 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1976).
129. 807 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986).
130. 588 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1978).
131. Id. at 606-07.
132. 588 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1978).
133. Smallwood was decided by Circuit Judges Van Oosterhout and Henley and Dis-
trict Judge Devitt. Reed was decided by Circuit Judges Lay and Bright and Dis-
trict Judge Van Sickle. Burkhalter was decided by Circuit Judges Lay, Ross, and
McMillian. Rodgers was decided by Circuit Judges Bright, Stephenson, and
McMillian. Goeller was decided by Circuit Judges Fagg, Bowman, and Timbers
(Judge Timbers was a Second Circuit Court of Appeals judge sitting by designa-
tion with the Eighth Circuit in Goeller).
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violations must be given to alleged violators. But the notice given
must still be fair notice in order to satisfy due process. Just what con-
stitutes fair notice is the problem. Even in criminal prosecutions,
charges couched in the statutory language, which is generally not fact
specific and is somewhat vague, are sufficient if they are specific
enough to enable a criminal defendant to prepare a defense and to
plead the judgment in bar. Alleged probation violations should not be
required to be more specific than criminal charges. However, the idea
that a notice separate from the motion or information to revoke is re-
quired has led to challenges, as well as the question of sufficient speci-
ficity of the allegations. The appellate courts have taken a practical
approach to such issues so far.
In State v. Kartman,134 no issue was raised on direct appeal with
respect to the sufficiency of the notice given to Kartman. However, in
the federal habeas action Kartman did attack the sufficiency of one
allegation in the information and notice. The court ruled the allega-
tion charging that Kartman had failed to comply with the terms of his
probation and had not demonstrated a good faith effort to rehabilitate
himself was not sufficiently specific, but the error was harmless be-
cause one of the proved allegations was specific enough.1 35 The court
held that where a motion to revoke includes more than one count, the
vagueness of one count "could well not render the entire proceeding
unconstitutional when the other counts are sufficiently specific and
the judge's findings of fact as per the specific counts are supported by
the evidence." 36
On appeal in the habeas action, Kartman claimed the notice of fi-
nal hearing was improper because he did not receive a copy of the pre-
liminary hearing officer's report until the day of the final hearing or
other written notice of the final hearing after the preliminary hearing.
The Eighth Circuit noted that Morrissey required that written notice
of the claimed violations must be given prior to the final hearing. The
notice given to Kartman was a written notice of preliminary hearing.
The court held the notice satisfied due process because the grounds for
violation remained unchanged following the preliminary hearing.137
The holding implies that where there is a change in the alleged
grounds for violation, a new notice is required to be given to the proba-
tioner.13 8 The court of appeals affirmed and noted that the charge
failed to apprise the probationer of the conditions of probation he al-
134. 192 Neb. 803, 224 N.W.2d 753 (1975).
135. Kartman v. Parratt, 397 F. Supp. 531, 533-34 (D. Neb. 1975).
136. Id. at 534.
137. Kartman v. Parratt, 535 F.2d 450, 456 (8th Cir. 1976).
138. Under State v. Ferree, 207 Neb. 593, 299 N.W.2d 777 (1980), any change in the
nature or identity of the alleged violations after preliminary hearing would re-
quire a new preliminary hearing to be accorded the probationer.
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legedly violated, and of the dates and events supporting the charge.139
In State v. Calder,140 the notice was deficient in not setting forth
the facts alleged to constitute violations. However, the probationer ac-
knowledged before the district judge in open court that he was famil-
iar with the contents of the motion to revoke. The motion did state
sufficient facts. Further, at the initial appearance, the district judge
advised the probationer about the nature of the allegations in the mo-
tion to revoke. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that Calder had
actual notice of the allegations of the motion. Therefore, the defi-
ciency of the notice of preliminary hearing was not prejudicial. Analo-
gizing to the rules relating to indictments, the court noted that due
process only requires that the accused be given sufficient notice of the
charges against him in order that he may prepare a defense.141 Ser-
vice on the probationer of a copy of the motion to revoke should be
sufficient notice of the alleged violations. Restating the allegations in
a separate notice of hearing is senseless paperwork, especially when
the notice of hearing and the motion can be combined in a single docu-
ment. The court did not require the use of two pieces of paper.
In State v. Nevells,142 the information to revoke alleged that the
probationer had violated the laws of the State of Nebraska on Novem-
ber 4, 1968. The court characterized the allegation as a specific charge
of a violation of the paragraph of the probation that required the pro-
bationer to be law abiding and to not violate any laws.1 43 The court
held the allegation was sufficiently specific. Since probation revoca-
tion proceedings are not a stage of a criminal case, only the due pro-
cess test of the sufficiency of the allegations and notices should apply.
The double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state constitutions
should not apply. However, prosecutors can finesse the issue by tak-
ing the few minutes necessary to be specific.
D. Confrontation and Hearsay
Alleged violators have the right at the final hearing to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless the hearing officer specif-
ically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation. 144 Normally,
disclosure of the identity of the state's witnesses and the substance of
their likely testimony would be helpful in preparing a defense. Con-
frontation is a criminal trial right. The confrontation clause has been
139. Kartman v. Parratt, 535 F.2d 450, 453 (8th Cir. 1976).
140. 212 Neb. 248, 322 N.W.2d 426 (1982).
141. Id. at 251, 322 N.W.2d at 428-29.
142. 185 Neb. 58, 173 N.W.2d 395 (1970).
143. Id. at 60, 173 N.W.2d at 396.
144. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
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held inapplicable to normal sentencing proceedings,145 but applicable
to supplemental sex offender proceedings.146 A revocation hearing is
not a criminal trial. Nevertheless, the Court has extended a condi-
tional confrontation right to probation revocation proceedings. Appel-
late courts have disagreed on the nature and mechanics of the
precedent finding of good cause necessary to a denial of confrontation
in probation revocation hearings.
In Kartman v. Parratt,147 the trial court denied the probationer the
opportunity to review his probation file at the preliminary hearing.
The probationer was allowed to examine the file at the final hearing.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that a probationer should
normally be given the names of persons who have provided informa-
tion against the probationer and should be granted the opportunity to
confront those persons. However, if the hearing officer finds an in-
formant would be subjected to a risk of harm if identified, then the
informant need not be subjected to confrontation and cross-examina-
tion. The court said that Morrissey does not require an express writ-
ten finding of a risk of harm. Therefore, since there was no showing of
prejudice to the probationer at the hearing, the court refused to as-
sume the hearing officer did not find that a risk of harm was
presented by identifying the informant at the preliminary hearing.148
A risk of harm to an informant is not the only acceptable basis for
a finding of good cause for denial of confrontation recognized by the
Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit has adopted a balancing test re-
quiring trial courts in probation revocation actions to balance the pro-
bationer's conditional right to confront adverse witnesses against the
reasons the government asserts for not requiring confrontation.
There are no fixed rules on what the government must present to es-
tablish good cause, but the court of appeals has listed the factors to be
used in evaluating the government's basis for its requested denial of
confrontation. 14 9 First, trial courts must assess the government's ex-
planation for its position that confrontation is undesirable or impracti-
cal. The examples the court gave are danger of harm to government
witnesses and the expense or difficulty of procuring the attendance of
live witnesses. The second factor trial courts must consider is the reli-
ability of the evidence the government offers as a substitute for live
testimony. When the trial court is persuaded that the burden of pro-
ducing live testimony is inordinate and offers demonstrably reliable
hearsay as a substitute, then the government has made a strong show-
145. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); State v. Whitehurst, 224 Neb. 174, 396
N.W.2d 433 (1984).
146. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
147. 535 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1976).
148. 1& at 457.
149. United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 642-43 (8th Cir. 1986).
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ing of good cause. However, if the government shows neither that
presenting live testimony would be unreasonably burdensome nor of-
fers as a substitute hearsay evidence bearing indicia of reliability, then
the probationer is entitled to confrontation. 15 0
In United States v. Bell,151 the government sought a revocation
based upon Bell's alleged violations of state and federal laws. The rev-
ocation hearing was held in Arkansas, Bell's place of residence at the
time of the probation sentence. Some time after the sentence, Bell
moved to Kansas. While living in Kansas, Bell was arrested by the
Wichita police for driving while intoxicated, possession of marijuana,
and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Wichita charges had not
been tried at the time of the revocation hearing. In addition, three
urine samples taken from Bell in Kansas under the probation order
tested positive for THC, indicating Bell's use of marijuana. Through
Bell's Kansas probation officer, the government offered the Wichita
police arrest reports and the reports of the California chemical labora-
tory that had done the urinalyses of Bell's samples.152 Bell objected
on both hearsay and confrontation grounds. The trial court overruled
the objections. The court of appeals noted a finding of good cause is
implicit in the decision to overrule a confrontation clause objection in
probation revocation proceedings. A remand for explicit findings of
good cause was not necessary.1 53
The court of appeals ruled the urinalysis reports bore substantial
indicia of reliability. The reports were the regular reports of a com-
pany whose business it was to conduct such tests with the expectation
that the company's clients would act on the company's reports. There
was no evidence contradicting Bell's alleged drug use. Bell made only
general, unsubstantiated claims that the analyses may have been de-
fective. The court of appeals found good cause existed to permit the
government to avoid the difficulty and expense of bringing the testing
personnel from California to Arkansas to testify in person.154
With respect to the Wichita police reports, the court of appeals con-
cluded the reports were reliable evidence that an arrest was made, but
were significantly less reliable evidence of the commission of the of-
fenses alleged. The Wichita officers could have been brought volunta-
rily or by subpoena to the hearing in Arkansas, but at considerable
expense. However, even though the court made these observations, it
chose not to use its balancing test, because Bell's admissions and the
detailed narrative in the reports established the reliability of the
arrest reports. However, the court carefully pointed out it was not
150. Id. at 643.
151. 785 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1986).
152. Id. at 642-43.
153. Id. at 643 n.3.
154. Id. at 643.
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endorsing the use of arrest reports instead of arresting officer testi-
mony in every revocation case.1 55 The court said:
Whether arrest reports are sufficiently reliable, and whether the expense and
inconvenience of producing live testimony are sufficiently great, to justify dis-
pensing with the right of confrontation, are questions to be faced on a case-by-
case basis considering all the relevant circumstances, including any admissions
that may have been made by the probationer or parolee. 1 5 6
An interesting twist gave the court the chance to deal with oral
hearsay and double hearsay within the good cause balancing test con-
text. The probation officer had received good reports about Bell dur-
ing the time he supervised Bell's case. For the sole purpose of
detracting from whatever weight the good reports testimony might
have had, the prosecutor cross-examined the probation officer on the
subject of an Arkansas state police investigation of Bell for drug traf-
ficking. The evidence presented in this manner was not the investiga-
tion reports, but only the probation officer's account of his
conversations with the investigating officers and with an FBI agent
not personally involved in the investigation. The court of appeals indi-
cated it would not have disapproved had the use of the evidence been
restricted to the government's purpose in eliciting it. However, the
district court did not so confine the evidence. The district court relied
in part on that evidence in its revocation decision. That hearsay and
double hearsay was the only evidence offered about any drug dealing.
With respect to that substantive use of that evidence, the court of ap-
peals ruled it was not sufficiently reliable and that the government
had not shown any difficulty would have been posed by calling local
officers to testify in person. Therefore, for substantive use, the admis-
sion of the oral hearsay violated Bell's conditional confrontation
right.157
In State v. Mosley,158 the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed a rev-
ocation record in which the trial court admitted hearsay to prove the
probationer's violation. The identity of the informant was disclosed,
but the informant was not produced at the final hearing. The investi-
gating police officer was allowed to testify at the final hearing to what
the informant had told him. The officer had no personal knowledge of
anything related to the violation. The probationer denied involve-
155. Id. at 643-44. In United States v. Pattman, 535 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1976), the al-
leged violation was a failure to report an arrest. The court of appeals approved
admission of an arrest report for the limited purpose of proving an arrest was
made.
156. United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir. 1986).
157. Id. at 644-45. The Eighth Circuit adhered to the Bell decision in United States v.
Burton, 866 F.2d 1057 (8th Cir. 1989), as it relates to the use of laboratory reports
without live foundation testimony. Bell was decided by Circuit Judges Arnold
and Wollman and District Judge Gunn. Burton was decided by Circuit Judges
Arnold, Gibson, and Bright.
158. 194 Neb. 740, 235 N.W.2d 402 (1975).
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ment in the violation. The court said there was no showing of possible
risk to the informant or other good cause why confrontation should
not have been granted. Further, the trial court made no determina-
tion of whether good cause had been shown. Therefore, the court re-
versed and remanded for further hearing, with instructions that the
right of confrontation be allowed unless the trial court specifically
found good cause for a denial.159
Ten years later, in State v. Ozmun,160 the court allowed hearsay in
a probation revocation. The probation officer was allowed to testify to
what he had been told by a counselor at an alcoholism treatment
center from which the probationer allegedly voluntarily absented her-
self without permission and whose rules she had violated during her
stay there. The probationer had admitted her violations to the proba-
tion officer. The court noted that the Nebraska Evidence Rules do not
apply in probation revocation proceedings. Therefore, the admission
of hearsay was not an error.
The court's opinion did not indicate whether the probationer only
objected on hearsay grounds or whether the probationer also charged
a violation of her conditional right of confrontation. Assuming a hear-
say objection also puts confrontation in issue,161 the only difference
between Ozmun and Mosley is Ozmun's admission to her probation
officer.
Ozmun's extrajudicial admission to her probation officer imparted
an aura of reliability to the hearsay, but it was still oral hearsay of the
type condemned in Bell. Bringing the alcohol program counselor from
Omaha to Kearney would not have entailed the difficulty involved in
interstate situations. But again, if Ozmun's counsel did not object on
confrontation grounds, the supreme court had no reason to consider
confrontation. It is counsel's obligation to raise the proper issues. The
courts should not be expected to do counsel's job.
Counsel should not rely on a hearsay objection to raise a confronta-
tion issue in any proceeding and especially not in a probation revoca-
tion hearing to which the rules of evidence do not apply. Specific
confrontation objections should be made whenever appropriate in pro-
bation revocation proceedings to avoid the possibility of waiving the
confrontation issue by failing to interpose the proper objection.
159. Id. at 744, 235 N.W.2d at 404-05.
160. 221 Neb. 481, 378 N.W.2d 170 (1985).
161. This is no small assumption and is probably erroneous. However, in view of the
supreme court's language in In re D.L.S., 230 Neb. 435, 432 N.W.2d 31 (1988), that
the rules of evidence can be used in deciding what type of evidence satisfies due
process, the court may have left an escape hatch open for counsel who fail to




The Morrissey-Gagnon rules do not include any mention of the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. In Minnesota v. Mur-
phy,162 the issue was whether the fifth and fourteenth amendments
prohibited admissions made by the defendant to his probation officer
during a mandatory meeting with the probation officer to be intro-
duced into evidence at a later criminal proceeding. The Court held the
admissions could be used in the criminal trial because they were vol-
untary and the defendant had not claimed his privilege and instead
answered the probation officer's^ incriminating questions. The Court
further held the probation officer was not required to give a Miranda
rights advisory prior to questioning the defendant. In reaching the
holdings in the case, the Court included a footnote with significance
for probation revocations.
If the questions put to a probationer by the probation officer in a
probation meeting are relevant to the probationary status and pose no
realistic threat of incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding,
then the privilege is inapplicable. The fact that a truthful answer
might lead to a revocation of probation does not render the privilege
applicable. A probation revocation proceeding is not a criminal pro-
ceeding. Even though due process must be provided in a revocation
proceeding, the rights accorded to accused persons in criminal pro-
ceedings do not apply.
Just as there is no right to a jury trial before probation may be revoked,
neither is the privilege ... available to a probationer. It follows that whether
or not the answer to a question about [the probationary status] is compelled by
the threat of revocation, there can be no valid claim of the privilege on the
ground that the information sought can be used in revocation proceedings.163
The example the Court used was a question relating to a residential
requirement. The situation would be different if the probationer was
in custody and was asked a question that could be incriminating.164
An alleged probation violator can be compelled to testify about the
alleged violations in the probationer's own revocation hearing over
self-incrimination objections based on both the federal and state con-
stitutions, as long as the state does not compel the probationer to in-
criminate himself or herself concerning a separate criminal offense. A
probation revocation hearing is not a stage of a criminal prosecution.
Admitting a probation violation is not necessarily admitting commis-
sion of a crime. Therefore, the constitutional privilege is not necessar-
ily implicated.165
162. 465 U.S. 420 (1984)(6-3 decision).
163. Id. at 435 n.7.
164. Id. at 429 n.5.
165. State v. Sites, 231 Neb. 624, 437 N.W.2d 166 (1989). The alleged violations about
which Sites was compelled to testify were his failure to attend Alcoholics Anony-
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In State v. Burow,166 the probationer challenged the revocation of
her probation on the ground that her admission was not voluntary and
intelligent because the revocation court did not advise her on the rec-
ord of her privilege against compulsory self-incrimination before ac-
cepting her admission. The Nebraska Supreme Court noted the
revocation court had advised the probationer of all her rights under
the Probation Act, and the Act does not require notice of the privilege.
The supreme court also noted the privilege, under both state and
federal constitutions, applies only to criminal cases and that probation
revocation hearings are not criminal proceedings. Therefore, "[t]he
admission... of the facts alleged in the motion to revoke was not a
criminal guilty plea, just as the result was not a new conviction but,
rather, a change in probationary status with respect to a previous con-
viction."' 1 67 So, the pleas tendered in probation revocation cases are
technically admissions and denials, not the familiar guilty, not guilty,
and no contest pleas. If the pleas in probation revocations are not the
familiar criminal pleas, the question arises as to what advice, if any,
must a revocation court give to an accused probationer?
F. Rights Advisory
The United States Supreme Court and the Nebraska Supreme
Court have not ruled whether a plea to a motion or information charg-
ing a probation violation must be tendered voluntarily, knowingly, and
mous meetings and to comply with antabuse therapy as conditions of driving
while intoxicated and driving under suspension probation. Those violations were
not separate crimes. Thus, there was no constitutional problem.
Sites represents the extent of the development of the idea of compelled testi-
mony of an accused probation violator. There are several instances in which ac-
cused probationers conceivably could be subject to efforts to compel their
testimony about separate criminal offenses in their own revocation proceedings.
Each such instance presents issues in the area of inapplicability of the privilege,
all of which are beyond the scope of this Article. For example, compelled testi-
mony about a crime for which the witness has been pardoned, on which the stat-
ute of limitations has run, as to which the witness has already been convicted, or
with respect to which the witness has been granted immunity does not implicate
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination because incrimination is
not possible in such instances. Other protective rules may apply, such as the priv-
ilege under NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1210 (1985) or due process considerations, but
the self-incrimination privilege does not.
166. 223 Neb. 867, 394 N.W.2d 665 (1986).
167. Id. at 869-70, 394 N.W.2d at 667. The court also disapproved of any suggestion in a
prior case that an admission of a probation violation is a guilty plea. State v.
Blankenbaker, 197 Neb. 344, 248 N.W.2d 773 (1977).
The Eighth Circuit agrees with the Nebraska Supreme Court that an admis-
sion to a probation violation charge is not a guilty plea, but an admission. Admit-
ting a probation violation is not even the equivalent of pleading guilty to a
criminal charge. As a result, a probationer need not be advised of the privilege
prior to tendering an admission at a revocation proceeding. United States v.
Rapert, 813 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1987).
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intelligently. However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in
United States v. Ross,168 a federal probation revocation, that a waiver
of counsel must be knowing and intelligent and that requires an expla-
nation of possible consequences of a revocation hearing.
In United States v. Johns,169 the probationer admitted a probation
violation through counsel. Her probation was revoked on the admis-
sion. She contended on appeal that the revocation court erred in not
addressing her personally to determine on the record that she under-
stood what rights she was waiving on her admission through counsel.
The court held that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 does not
apply to probation revocations. The Fifth Circuit did not rule on the
applicability of Boykin v. Alabama, holding instead that the error, if
any, was harmless. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that
both Boykin and Rule 11 are inapplicable in probation revocation
proceedings.170
In United States v. Rapert,171 the Eighth Circuit held that neither
Rule 11 nor Boykin apply to probation revocation proceedings. As a
result, a rights advisory is unnecessary. Further, because Rapert was
advised of the possible penalties at the time he tendered his plea to the
underlying criminal charge, it was not necessary to advise him again of
the penalties at his revocation proceeding. The theoretical justifica-
tions underlying Boykin do not obtain in probation revocation pro-
ceedings. A probationer in revocation actions has no right to a jury
trial, only an attentuated right of confrontation, and only a limited
self-incrimination privilege. 172
G. Written Statement of Factfinder
The Morrissey-Gagnon rules require the hearing officer to prepare,
after the revocation hearing, a written statement as to the evidence
relied on and the reasons for revoking probation in the event of a revo-
cation. In State v. Jaworski,173 the Nebraska Supreme Court dealt
with the need for and sufficiency of the written statement after final
168. 503 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1974).
169. 625 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1980). But see Hicks v. State, 452 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Ct. App.
1984), aff'd, 478 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1985)(before accepting plea in probation revoca-
tion proceeding, court must advise of right to counsel); State v. Bryan, 284 Md.
152, 395 A.2d 475 (1978)(Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to proba-
tion revocation proceedings).
170. United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919
(1977).
171. 813 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1987).
172. Id. at 185. Any implication that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure applies to probation revocations arising out of the Court's language in
United States v. Smallwood, 536 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1976) is invalid after Rapert.
173. 194 Neb. 645, 234 N.W.2d 221 (1975). Accord Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207
(10th Cir. 1983); State v. MacFarland, 195 Neb. 395, 238 N.W.2d 237 (1976).
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hearing. First, the court distinguished both Morrissey and Gagnon as
cases involving revocations by administrative agencies, not by courts.
The United States Supreme Court has not dealt with judicial proba-
tion revocations as provided for in the Probation Act. The court also
noted that the requirement of a written statement does not fit the pat-
tern of a judicial hearing in a court of record in which the proceedings,
findings, and judgments are recorded and subject to appellate review.
The court said: "It would be strange indeed if the formal require-
ments of fact finding and determination of guilt were to be more strict
at a probation revocation hearing than at an original criminal trial."174
The supreme court also admonished trial courts:
Good practice under the ... Act dictates that the trial court's order of its
findings, reasons, and conclusions should be reasonably detailed and pre-
cise.... The trial courts should also take additional care with the written
findings where there are multiple charges of acts constituting violations of...
probation in order to make sure that findings are made for each specific
charge. ... In its written findings and judgment in the record the court need
only refer to the evidence in the record.17 5
The court's admonition was made under Nebraska statutory law and
could easily be made into a supervisory rule as an independent state
standard.
In Kartman v. Parratt,176 the Eighth Circuit reviewed the revoking
state judge's written statement of evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking probation. The state judge had referred to the conduct for
which revocation was sought and to the condition of probation alleg-
edly violated. The court of appeals explained: "The purpose of the
written statement is to allow the reviewing court to determine
whether there was a factual basis for revocation and to provide the
probationer with a record of the proceeding so as to protect him from a
second revocation proceeding based on the same conduct."177
Viewed in that light, the question was still a close one, but, even
though meager, the revoking court's findings were sufficient to satisfy
appellate review. Whether the findings were sufficient for the proba-
tioner's protective record was not addressed, leading to the inference
that the court of appeals was not especially concerned about that use
of the record. Further, the court did not indicate the basis for the idea
that a probationer is entitled to a record for double jeopardy defense
purposes. After Kartman, it did not appear the Eighth Circuit would
demand strict compliance with the written statement requirement of
Morrissey-Gagnon. However, Kartman was an instance of a federal
court reviewing the acts of a state court just a short time after Gagnon
was announced.
174. State v. Jaworski, 194 Neb. 645, 647, 234 N.W.2d 221, 223 (1975).
175. Id. at 647-48, 234 N.W.2d at 223.
176. 535 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1976).
177. Id. at 457-58.
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Later, in United States v. Lacey,178 the federal district judge did not
make findings of fact, did not describe the evidence relied upon, and
stated only general principles as reasons for the revocation. The court
held that the general conclusory reasons given for the revocation did
not meet the due process requirement that the revoking judge state
the factual findings and the reasons for the revocation. The court re-
manded the case to the district court for further proceedings which it
said could include the task of making proper findings and stating
proper reasons for the revocation if the district court still believed rev-
ocation was warranted.
In Morishita v. Morris,179 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
viewed a state probation revocation in which the state court did not
prepare a written statement. Morishita contended he was denied due
process by that omission. The court of appeals distinguished Gagnon
by pointing out that Gagnon dealt with an administrative revocation,
not a judicial revocation. In Morashita, the state court had prepared a
transcript of the proceedings and the state court was a court of record.
The court of appeals held that written findings are constitutionally
required only if the transcript and record do not enable a reviewing
court to determine the basis of the trial court's decision to revoke the
probation.S0 The Tenth Circuit seemed inclined to a more informal
and less burdensome revocation procedure than did the Eighth
Circuit.
Then, in Bearden v. Georgia,181 the United States Supreme Court
held that in probation revocation proceedings based upon a failure to
pay fines or restitution, the revocation court must inquire into the rea-
sons for the failure to pay. If the probationer's failure to pay was will-
ful or if the probationer had failed to make good faith efforts to pay,
then revocation followed by a sentence within the statutorily pre-
scribed limits of incarceration could be imposed. H owever, if the pro-
bationer could not pay despite sufficient good faith efforts to amass
the resources to do so, then the revocation court must consider alter-
natives to imprisonment. Only if the alternatives are inadequate to
satisfy the state's need for punishment and deterrence may imprison-
ment be imposed on a probationer who has made sufficient good faith
efforts to pay.1 8 2
In order to meet the Court's Bearden requirements, revocation
courts must make adequate records to sustain their decisions on appel-
late review. Findings of fact are necessary, and the findings must be
accessible to the reviewing court. Whether written decisions are re-
178. 648 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1981).
179. 702 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1983).
180. Id. at 210.
181. 461 U.S. 660 (1983)(announced two months after Morashita).
182. Id. at 672.
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quired in all cases was not addressed. The revocation courts, there-
fore, must state their findings in open court on the record or prepare
detailed written decisions in order to facilitate appellate review.
In Black v. Romano,8 3 the Court held that revocation courts need
not explicitly state why alternatives to incarceration were rejected.
The record before the Court included a memorandum prepared by the
state trial judge and a transcript of the proceedings. The Court consid-
ered the memorandum and transcript to comport with due process,18 4
even though neither contained an explicit statement of the revocation
court's reasons for rejecting alternatives to imprisonment. The major-
ity opinion said the purpose of the Morrissey-Gagnon written state-
ment requirement was to help insure accurate fact finding with
respect to any alleged violation and to provide an adequate basis for
review to determine if the decision rests on permissible grounds sup-
ported by the evidence. 8 5 The concurring opinion said the written
statement allows courts to determine whether revocations are sub-
stantively valid or fundamentally unfair even without recorded con-
sideration of alternatives to revocation.1 86
Romano was a federal habeas action attacking a state judicial revo-
cation. The Court did not seem to back away from its commitment to
the written statement requirement of Morrissey-Gagnon. The distinc-
tion made in some of the cases of judicial, as opposed to administrative
revocations, as it relates to the need for a written statement, does not
seem viable after Romano. Cautious revocation courts will take the
time to prepare written statements under the Morrissey-Gagnon
rules.
Two months after Romano, the Eighth Circuit decided United
States v. Smith, 8 7 an appeal from a federal probation revocation. The
federal district judge did not prepare a written statement of evidence
relied upon and the reasons for the revocation. Smith contended on
appeal that the absence of a written statement violated his due process
rights, and therefore, a remand to obtain a written statement was nec-
essary in order to obtain a written statement for appellate review pur-
poses. The government contended the written statement requirement
was inapplicable because the revocation was conducted in a court of
record and the hearing was transcribed. The government relied on
183. 471 U.s. 606 (1985).
184. Id. at 616.
185. Id. at 613-14. What the Court meant by "transcript" is unclear. In Nebraska prac-
tice, a transcript consists of certified copies of case filings. A transcription is a
written verbatim record of oral proceedings used for purposes other than appeals.
If used for an appeal, then a transcription is a bill of exceptions.
186. Id. at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring). (The Court also noted the diminished justifi-
cation for requiring judges to explain their rulings when the risk of unfairness
has already been minimized by other procedural safeguards).
187. 767 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1985).
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the Morishita v. Morris decision. 88 The court of appeals rejected the
government's contention for two reasons.
First, the Romano case dealt with a judicial revocation and the
Court reaffirmed its written statement requirement in Romano any-
way. Second, the Morishita case was factually distinguishable in that
only one allegation of probation violation was involved in that case. In
Smith, there were two alleged probation violations. A written state-
ment of the evidence relied upon is thus necessary for a meaningful
appellate review. As a result, the Jaworski L89 rule in Nebraska is in
some doubt. However, none of the appellate courts has addressed the
point made by the Nebraska Supreme Court that the written state-
ment requirement is more than is required in the underlying criminal
proceeding. 90 The heavier caseload and lack of resources faced by
state courts should also be taken into consideration by federal courts
in setting minimum requirements.' 9 '
VI. DEFENSES TO PROBATION VIOLATION ALLEGATIONS
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not specifically named any de-
fenses to probation violation allegations. However, the court has con-
sidered several approaches that could constitute defenses if the facts
fit the theory advanced. Of course, the basic defenses lie in the denial
of the violation as a factual matter, in the presentation of facts that
would excuse the violations, and in the presentation of mitigating cir-
cumstances or other reasons why revocation would not be warranted,
despite the violation.
A. Illegally Obtained Evidence
State v. HowardL92 established the proposition that evidence seized
in violation of the Constitution is incompetent evidence and is for that
reason inadmissible in probation revocation proceedings. 9 3 Howard
involved an unusual fact pattern in which the defendant's probation
188. 702 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1983).
189. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
190. Again, it could be argued that more should be done in entering verdicts of convic-
tion in terms of stating the evidence relied upon in reaching findings of guilt and
perhaps the reasoning process used in deciding criminal cases. However, requir-
ing juries to produce written statements of the evidence they relied upon and
their reasoning processes would be quite awkward in most cases. No more should
be required of judges hearing criminal cases without juries than is required of the
juries themselves.
191. There have been no Nebraska, Eighth Circuit, or United States Supreme Court
decisions dealing with the probationer's right to appear in person and to present
witnesses and defense evidence at the final hearing. See N. COHEN & J. GOBERT,
supra note 30, at §§ 9.22-9.36.
192. 193 Neb. 45, 225 N.W.2d 391 (1975).
193. Id. at 54, 225 N.W.2d at 397.
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forbade Howard from being in a state of intoxication in public or in a
motor vehicle. Howard was found alone and unconscious in a car that
had been in a collision. A police officer obtained a blood sample from
Howard at the hospital while Howard was still unconscious without a
warrant, without consent, and under circumstances not covered by the
implied consent statute. The court held the sample was obtained in-
voluntarily and in violation of the fourth amendment. 94 The general-
ization from Howard is that evidence obtained in violation of the
Constitution cannot be used to revoke probation. However, evidence
seized in a warrantless residential search, to which a probationer is
required to submit under a probation condition, can be used to revoke
probation.195
B. Inability to Pay
The Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the Bearden rule in State v.
Heaton. 96 In Heaton, the court held that where the alleged violation
of probation is the failure to make restitution, the evidence must
clearly and convincingly show that the probationer has willfully re-
fused to make restitution when the probationer has the resources to
pay or has failed to make sufficient good faith efforts to seek employ-
ment and otherwise acquire the resources to make restitution.197
Thus, indigent probationers can defend against failure to pay allega-
tions on the grounds that their failure to pay was not willful, that they
have not had the resources to pay, and that they have made sufficient
good faith efforts to acquire the resources to pay.198 If the revocation
court finds the failure to pay was willful for reasons unrelated to abil-
ity to pay, then further analysis under Bearden is unnecessary. 99
194. Id. at 53, 225 N.W.2d at 396. The Eighth Circuit has held the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation proceedings. United
States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1978).
195. State v. Morgan, 206 Neb. 818, 295 N.W.2d 285 (1980).
196. 225 Neb. 702, 407 N.W.2d 780 (1987),followed in, State v. Englehart, 231 Neb. 579,
437 N.W.2d 468 (1989).
197. Id. at 705, 407 N.W.2d at 783.
198. The legislature has adopted the Bearden standard as part of its restitution sen-
tencing act. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2284 (Cum. Supp. 1988)(which expressly
applies to probation revocations).
The situation of persons sentenced to probation on convictions of criminal
nonsupport with a probation requirement that they pay support arrearages is
analogous to the situation of defendants required to pay restitution and fines as
conditions of probation. Probationers in such cases against whom revocations are
sought on the basis of failure to pay their support arrearages logically ought to be
able to interpose the defense of inability to pay under Bearden. Back child sup-
port is a debt as is restitution. Indigence is the same in either case.
199. Martin v. Solem, 801 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1986).
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C. Revocation Motion Filed Too Late
In a case where there has been a substantial time lapse between
the end of the probation term and the commencement of revocation
proceedings, a former probationer may be able to raise successfully
the defense that the revocation proceedings were not initiated within
the probation term nor within a reasonable time thereafter. In State
v. White,200 the court held that a proceeding to revoke probation may
be instituted within the probationary period or within a reasonable
time thereafter. The revocation proceeding in White was commenced
on the day after the term of probation ended.201
VII. MISCELLANEOUS CONCERNS
A. Invalid Conditions and Appeals
A probationer must take a direct appeal in order to attack the va-
lidity of a requirement of a probation order as well as to attack the
validity of the conviction on the grounds that the probationer's guilty
plea was involuntary.202 A probation order is a final, appealable order.
However, State v. Ozmun 2 3 was an appeal after a probation revoca-
tion. In Ozmun, the court took notice on its own motion that there
was no showing in the plea taking record that Ozmun was either rep-
resented or had waived counsel at the time of the prior conviction;
therefore, the court reversed the enhancement of the conviction.2 04
Under a strict application of the State v. Williams205 rule, a proba-
tioner who did not challenge by direct appeal the validity of a condi-
tion of the probation would be foreclosed from violating the condition
involved and then attacking the validity of the condition in the ensu-
ing revocation proceeding. However, the court could take notice of the
condition and its invalidity if that were the case. Also, the court might
200. 193 Neb. 93, 225 N.W.2d 426 (1975).
201. Id. at 94, 225 N.W.2d at 427. The court has not considered some other possible
defenses such as a claim that the later conviction alleged as a violation of proba-
tion is not final but is pending on appeal, see, ag., United States v. Gentile, 610
F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1979), or a claim that the later conviction alleged as a probation
violation is an invalid conviction, see, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 771 F.2d 1369
(9th Cir. 1985).
202. See, e.g., State v. Jacobson, 221 Neb. 639, 379 N.W.2d 772 (1986); State v. Williams,
194 Neb. 483, 233 N.W.2d 772 (1975). Of course, post conviction proceedings and
federal habeas proceedings are not affected by the rules relating to direct appeals.
In the context of an appeal from a revocation of probation by a federal district
court, the Eighth Circuit refused to consider the probationer's claims that his plea
to the underlying charge was involuntary and that he had ineffective counsel at
that time. United States v. Goeller, 807 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986).
203. 221 Neb. 481, 378 N.W.2d 170 (1985).
204. Id. at 482, 378 N.W.2d at 172 (nor was there a record of an enhahcement hearing
nor of the trial court's findings on enhancement).
205. 194 Neb. 483, 233 N.W.2d 772 (1975).
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allow an exception to the Williams rule in order to do substantial jus-
tice. It seems doubtful that the court would enforce an invalid proba-
tion condition simply because the probationer failed to take a direct
appeal.
B. Which Court is the Sentencing Court?
In State v. Daniels,208 the county court tried the case and sentenced
the probationer. The sentence was later affirmed by the district court
on appeal. The Nebraska Supreme Court held, however, that the dis-
trict court does not obtain jurisdiction to entertain the later revocation
proceeding. Instead, the county court remains the sentencing court
despite the concept that the judgment of the district court vacates the
judgment of the county court even if affirmed on appeal. The Daniels
decision was worded broadly enough so that it should also apply in
cases in which the district court reverses or modifies the sentence of
the county court. The district court, when hearing appeals from the
county court, is an intermediate court of appeals. Appellate courts do
not have jurisdiction over matters requiring the taking of evidence un-
less a special statute applies. The review by the district court of
county court judgments is a review of the record for error only.20 7
C. Jail Credit
Jail time imposed as a condition of probation does not count against
time imposed on resentence after revocation. 208 However, if a proba-
tioner is arrested and held pending revocation proceedings, the time
spent in jail awaiting revocation must be credited against a maximum
sentence imposed after revocation. 209 Whether presentence jail time
must be credited against any jail time imposed as a condition of proba-
tion remains an open question, but granting credit does not appear to
be required.
D. Driver's License Sanctions
The State v. Schulz210 decision created a serious limitation on
courts imposing driver's license sanctions after probation revocations
on all criminal charges to which court ordered driver's license sanc-
tions apply as part of straight (nonprobation) sentences.2 11 The stat-
206. 224 Neb. 264, 397 N.W.2d 631 (1986).
207. Id. at 266-67, 397 N.W.2d at 633. The record on appeal need not be complete. It is
sufficient if it contains enough evidence to establish a violation by clear and con-
vincing evidence. State v. Schulz, 221 Neb. 473, 378 N.W.2d 165 (1985).
208. State v. Schulz, 221 Neb. 473, 378 N.W.2d 165 (1985).
209. State v. Jacobson, 221 Neb. 639, 379 N.W.2d 772 (1986).
210. 221 Neb. 473, 378 N.W.2d 165 (1985).
211. Court-ordered driver's license sanctions are part of the straight sentences applica-
ble to the following offenses (there may be more hidden in the statutes): operat-
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ute involved in Schulz required the sentencing court to revoke a
straight sentenced offender's license "as part of the judgment of con-
viction... for a period of one year from the date of... conviction." 212
ing a motor vehicle in an effort to avoid arrest or citation, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
905 (1985); driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-
669.07 (1988); refusal to submit to chemical test, NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-669.08
(1988); operating a motor vehicle during a period of revocation, suspension, or
impoundment, NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-430.01 (1988); willful reckless driving, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 39-669.04 (1988); willful reckless driving second offense and reckless
driving second offense, NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.05 (1988); willful reckless driving
third offense and reckless driving third offense, NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-669.06
(1988); failure to stop and render aid after personal injury accident, NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 39-6,104.01, 39-6,104.03 (1988); and, there is a catch-all provision relating
to offenses committed in such manner as to endanger life, limb, or property,
which is certainly applicable to first offense reckless driving, but its scope is not
easily determinable, NEB. REV. STAT. §,60-427 (1988).
212. State v. Schulz, 221 Neb. 473, 478, 378 N.W.2d 165, 169 (1985)(quoting NEB. REV.
STAT. § 39.669.07(2) (1984)). What constitutes the date of conviction, whether it is
the date an offender's plea of guilty or no contest is accepted, the date a verdict of
guilty is rendered (in contested cases), or the date of the first sentence to be im-
posed (a probation sentence is a judgment of conviction), is an interesting ques-
tion essentially outside the scope of this Article. The alternative that creates the
fewest administrative problems is the date the first sentence is imposed. How-
ever, the supreme court has held that the date the plea of guilty or no contest is
accepted is the date of conviction for purposes of the allowable period of driver's
license sanctions. State v. McKain, 230 Neb. 817, 434 N.W.2d 10 (1989).
In order to allow for the consideration of presentence investigations where it
is desirable to do so, in cases in which license sanctions are a part of the penalties,
trial courts will be forced, under McKain, to decline acceptance of the pleas until
the date set for sentencing. Otherwise, the license sanctions will have to be im-
posed separately from the rest of the sentences (a strange and potentially invalid
approach). The license sanctions are generally to be made a part of the judgment
of conviction. The alternative is to sentence without the benefit of presentence
investigations, which reduces the ability to individualize sentences. In Schulz, the
court used the date of the judgment of conviction (the date of the probation sen-
tence) in determining the allowable period of license revocation because the rec-
ord presented to the supreme court did not reveal the date the defendant's plea
was accepted.
LB 377, 90th Leg., 2d Sess., 1988 NEB. LAws [hereinafter LB 377], has rendered
the McKain holding inapplicable to cases arising under NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 39-
669.07, 39-669.08 (1988) after the effective date of LB 377. However, there are
some probation sentences predating LB 377 that could become revocation cases to
which McKain will apply as well as potentially a few such cases still pending on
appeal. There could also be some driving under suspension or revocation cases
that could be affected due to invalid revocations and suspensions imposed under
the pre-McKain understanding and before LB 377.
Trial courts and counsel must also be aware of and apply that part of LB 377
providing that license sanctions under NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 39-669.07, 39-669.08
(1988) shall not be served concurrently with any jail sentences imposed. The li-
cense sanctions will have to be ordered to take effect on the defendants' discharge
from jail in jail sentence cases.
Finally, since most of the statutes providing for license sanctions, including
the statutes involved in Schulz and McKain, require that the sanctions be im-
posed as part of the judgment of conviction, the logic of Schulz and McKain ap-
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The court found that statutory language modified the general statute
allowing courts to impose on probation violators such new sentences
as might have been imposed originally.2 1 3 The probation sentence is
the judgment of conviction. The supreme court reasoned the statute
in Schulz allowed a one-year license revocation for only the period of
the one year following imposition of the probation sentence. There-
fore, on resentence following revocation of the probation sentence, the
trial court could not revoke Schulz's license for one year commencing
on the date of the resentence. Schulz involved a second offense driv-
ing under the influence conviction. The Nebraska Legislature has at-
tempted to remove the Schulz limitation by its adoption of LB 377214
for all driving under the influence and refusal to submit cases arising
plies to most license sanction sentences. Thus, in one sense, Schulz and McKain
have limited direct applicability, but they could lead indirectly to considerable
mischief in a large number of cases if the supreme court adheres to the McKain
date of conviction rule.
The supreme court has adopted several definitions of conviction:
1) For purposes of impeachment by proof of a prior conviction, entry of a guilty
plea does not ripen into a conviction until sentence is imposed (the judgment
of conviction). Ford v. State, 106 Neb. 439, 184 N.W. 70 (1921); Marion v. State,
16 Neb. 349, 20 N.W. 289 (1884).
2) For purposes of a constitutional provision declaring a public office vacant upon
conviction of a felony, the court said a guilty plea or verdict plus a sentence
constitutes a conviction. State ex rel Hunter v. Jurgensen, 135 Neb. 136, 280
N.W. 886 (1938).
3) For purposes of computing the time for the filing of a motion for new trial, the
finding of guilt and the imposition of sentence constitute a conviction. State v.
Mosely, 194 Neb. 740, 235 N.W.2d 402 (1975)
4) A finding of guilty is a conviction, but it is not appealable until a judgment
(sentence) is imposed. In re Wolkow, 206 Neb. 512, 293 N.W.2d 851 (1980);
State v. Long, 205 Neb. 252, 286 N.W.2d 772 (1980).
In State v. Kramer, 231 Neb. 437, 439, 436 N.W.2d 524, 526 (1989), the
supreme court ruled that its Wolkow and Long holdings overruled by implica-
tion its definitions of conviction in Jurgensen and Mosely. Thus, there is a
distinction between a conviction and a judgment of conviction.
5) A plea of guilty or no contest, accepted and entered by the court, is a convic-
tion or the equivalent of a conviction, the effect of which is to authorize the
imposition of sentence. Stewart v. Ress, 164 Neb. 876, 83 N.W.2d 901 (1957);
Taylor v. State, 159 Neb. 210, 66 N.W.2d 514 (1954). However, this line of cases,
relied upon in McKain, does not really define "conviction," but is directed at
the effects of the pleas of guilty and no contest.
6) Finally, in Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 86 Neb. 17, 124 N.W. 937 (1910), the
court held that the word "convicted" when used in a statutory phrase must
refer to a determination of guilt in a criminal proceeding. The court was de-
ciding whether the liability imposed by the statute in question was intended to
be criminal or civil liability.
213. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2268 (1985).
214. Codified as NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 39-669.07, 39-669.08 (1988), providing that the li-
cense revocation shall be administered upon sentencing, upon final judgment af-
ter appeal, or upon the date of any probation revocation.
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after the effective date of LB 377.215
However, the legislature did not attempt to remove the Schulz lim-
itation from any of the other offenses to which Schulz logically ap-
plies. It is necessary, therefore, that courts and counsel carefully
consider the effect of Schulz whenever probation is revoked and a new
sentence is imposed on any charge for which a driver's license sanction
is part of the sentence. While the applicability of Schulz depends upon
the language of the statute involved, Schulz probably applies across
the board to all driver's license sanction sentences, with the possible
exception of sanctions imposed under section 60-427 of the Nebraska
Revised Statutes.216 Section 60-427 does not refer to the date of the
judgment or imposing the license sanction as a part of the judgment of
conviction. All of the other sanction statutes are tied to the date of the
judgment in some way.217
E. Violation of Community Service Sentences
The legislature has authorized the use of community service
sentences as an alternative to fines or imprisonment to be imposed as
a condition of probation sentences or as straight (nonprobation)
sentences for specified classes of offenses.218 Offenders who fail to
perform community service sentences may be arrested, and, after a
hearing, be resentenced on the original charge, have their probations
revoked, or be found in contempt.21 9 If the failure to perform is a
violation of a probation condition, the required hearing obviously must
be a probation revocation hearing conducted in compliance with the
Morrissey-Gagnon rules. Normal contempt procedures should be used
if the failure is treated as a contempt.220 But, if the failure to perform
is a violation of a straight sentence, and the court221 chooses to use the
resentence approach, then the procedures to be followed at the re-
quired hearing are not prescribed in the statute.
Since one function of alternative sentences to community service is
215. LB 377 took effect on July 9, 1988. Rather than face arguments about retroactive
application of LB 377, this author applies it only to cases arising after its effective
date. Perhaps retroactive application would not be an ex post facto violation, but
there is no good reason to push the issue.
216. NEB. REv. STAT. § 60-427 (1988).
217. See statutes cited supra note 214.
218. NEa. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2277 to 29-2279 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
219. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2278 (Cum. Supp. 1988). Note: a specific, direct authoriza-
tion of arrests for a specified type of probation violation, but still no warrant issu-
ance authority.
220. Presumably, the failure to perform would be a criminal contempt to be followed
by a contempt sentence upon an adjudication of guilt.
221. Who decides which remedy to pursue is an interesting question implicating mat-
ters of proper judicial role, beyond the scope of this Article.
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to allow offenders who might otherwise be imprisoned 222 to retain
their liberty subject to the condition that they perform the community
service as ordered,223 the position of an offender straight sentenced to
perform community service is analogous to the position of a proba-
tioner. Such an offender has an interest in continued conditional lib-
erty much like the interest of a probationer in continued conditional
liberty. The state has an interest in efficient enforcement of the com-
munity service sentence. The principles underlying Morrissey and Ga-
gnon should apply to the situation of alleged community service
straight sentence violators, but there has been no resolution of this
lack of clarity in the community service sentence statutes.224 Cer-
tainly, trial courts would be following a safe path should they apply
the Morrissey-Gagnon rules to community service straight sentence
violation hearings. Counsel for both parties should advocate the use of
the Morrissey-Gagnon rules in such cases. 225
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court,
and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals apply essentially the same
rules to probation revocation proceedings, except with respect to the
requirement of written statements of evidence relied upon and rea-
sons for revocation, the need for preliminary hearings, and the types
of violations that warrant revocation. The Nebraska Supreme Court
does not require written statements of evidence relied upon and rea-
sons for revocation, even though it has said the better practice is to
prepare such statements when there are two or more alleged viola-
tions. Both the Eighth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court
require written statements, although the Eighth Circuit has not in-
sisted on detailed statements from state revocation courts. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court requires preliminary hearings or waivers in all
cases on independent state grounds. The Eighth Circuit requires pre-
liminary hearings only for probationers who are in custody. The
United States Supreme Court has not taken a position since Gagnon.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has affirmed revocations based upon
violations of any condition of probation. The Eighth Circuit intermit-
tently requires law violations or ,antisocial acts as the predicates for
revocation. The United States Supreme Court has taken a position
only with respect to failure to make restitution as the alleged
violation.
222. At least on class III misdemeanors and above. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2279
(Cum. Supp. 1988).
223. In this sense, probation itself is an alternative sentence.
224. The legislative history is silent on the type of hearing the legislature had in mind.
225. The prosecution should not be anxious to have to retry such matters due to proce-
dural deficiencies.
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Because of the fiction that probation revocation proceedings are
not part of their antecedent criminal proceedings, many of the rules of
criminal procedure are inapplicable. Probation revocation law is a dis-
crete, developing legal area, a basic knowledge of which should be
mastered by judges, those practitioners who handle criminal cases
only sporadically, and criminal law specialists. The basic rules are es-
tablished. Only the fine points remain to be developed. In the absence
of specific precedents or statutory provisions, fundamental fairness
should be the guiding star when an unanswered question of procedure
arises in a probation revocation proceeding.
